別小看“富二代”
在關(guān)于家族企業(yè)的逸聞中，能力堪憂的繼承人是一個(gè)反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的主題。當(dāng)能力強(qiáng)得多的父母退休或離世時(shí)，他們性格軟弱的子女被推至最高位，卻只會(huì)奉行逐漸搞砸家業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略，而老員工會(huì)嘀咕“我早就告訴過你會(huì)這樣”。
People trust family businesses significantly more than they trust business in general, according to an opinion poll by Edelman. More than twice as many people want to work for them as do not — and are more committed. Customers will pay more for their products.
愛德曼(Edelman)的一項(xiàng)民調(diào)顯示，人們對家族企業(yè)的信任度遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于總體上對企業(yè)的信任。希望為家族企業(yè)工作的人數(shù)是不愿意的兩倍多，而且前者更有責(zé)任感?？蛻粼敢鉃榧易迤髽I(yè)的產(chǎn)品支付更多錢。
But they shudder when introduced to Junior and his siblings. Nearly two-thirds believe the next generation will mismanage the company and just over half of family business employees think scions are less talented than their forebears.
但在這些家族企業(yè)被“富二代”接管后，他們感到不寒而栗。近三分之二的受訪者認(rèn)為，富二代將把公司搞亂，而在家族企業(yè)的雇員中，略微超過半數(shù)認(rèn)為，富二代不像他們的上一輩那樣有才能。
Hang on, though. Throwing out the baby could also be rash. What looks like bath water could in fact be a cocktail of important family traits that gives the business its competitive advantage.
然而，也別太快下結(jié)論。潑臟水時(shí)可能把孩子一起潑掉?？雌饋硐裣丛杷臇|西，實(shí)際上可能包含各種重要的家族特質(zhì)，正是這些特質(zhì)賦予了家族企業(yè)競爭優(yōu)勢。
In 2014, I castigated Rupert Murdoch for producing a succession plan that in effect allowed the family to maintain both ownership and management of their media empire. I wrote that he should instead have emulated Leonardo Del Vecchio, founder of the Luxottica eyewear business, who had passed management to trained professionals 10 years earlier.
2014年，我批評過魯珀特•默多克(Rupert Murdoch)制定的一項(xiàng)接班計(jì)劃，后者實(shí)際上是讓默多克家族維持對其媒體帝國的所有權(quán)和管理權(quán)。我寫道，他應(yīng)該效仿眼鏡集團(tuán)Luxottica創(chuàng)始人萊昂納多•戴爾•維吉奧(Leonardo Del Vecchio)，后者10年前就把企業(yè)管理交給了受過訓(xùn)練的專業(yè)人士。
Upsetting my thesis, Mr Del Vecchio, now in his 80s, promptly reversed his hands-off strategy, stepped back in to take control and set off on a dealmaking spree, causing share price and governance turmoil.
推翻我的命題的是，如今80多歲的維吉奧迅速逆轉(zhuǎn)了自己放手不管的戰(zhàn)略，重新執(zhí)掌該集團(tuán)并發(fā)起了一波交易潮，導(dǎo)致公司股價(jià)和治理陷入動(dòng)蕩。
Meanwhile, Mr Murdoch, having tested his older offspring — Lachlan, James and Elisabeth — in different parts of the empire, has anointed Lachlan and James as the most likely to lead the group into the future.
與此同時(shí)，默多克在其企業(yè)帝國的不同地盤考驗(yàn)了較年長的子女——拉克蘭(Lachlan)、詹姆斯(James)和伊麗莎白(Elisabeth)，并選定拉克倫和詹姆斯作為最有可能帶領(lǐng)該集團(tuán)走向未來的接班人。
Like me, you may disapprove of the Murdochs’ style, particularly their UK newspapers’ involvement in the phone- hacking scandal. You may worry about James’s potential conflicts of interest at Sky, the pay-TV group, where he is likely to face investor protest as he stands for re-election as chair, despite being chief executive of 21st Century Fox, which is trying to take Sky over.
你或許像我一樣不贊成默多克家族的行事方式，尤其是其在英國發(fā)行的報(bào)紙卷入了電話竊聽丑聞。你或許擔(dān)心詹姆斯在付費(fèi)電視集團(tuán)天空電視臺(tái)(Sky)的潛在利益沖突，他很可能在爭取連任集團(tuán)董事長時(shí)面臨投資者抗議，因?yàn)樗彩?1世紀(jì)?？怂构?21st Century Fox)首席執(zhí)行官，該公司正試圖收購天空電視臺(tái)。
But many families are now using a Murdoch succession template. Instead of ditching heirs on the basis of surname alone, they are selecting the siblings best suited for operational roles, testing them in other parts of the business, or setting them free to run their own start-ups first.
但是，如今許多家族都在效仿默多克的接班模式。他們根據(jù)子女的具體特點(diǎn)為其選擇最合適的運(yùn)營職位，在企業(yè)的其他部分對他們進(jìn)行考驗(yàn)，或者先讓他們自由經(jīng)營自己的初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，而不是僅依據(jù)姓氏取舍。
Choosing a favourite remains an emotional decision. The potential for error is still great. King Lear remains a fine case study of succession planning gone horribly wrong.
選擇自己最喜歡的接班人仍是一種情緒化的決定。出錯(cuò)的可能性仍然很大。《李爾王》(King Lear)的故事仍是一個(gè)關(guān)于繼承計(jì)劃發(fā)生嚴(yán)重問題的經(jīng)典案例研究。
But Denise Kenyon-Rouvinez, director of the Global Family Business Centre at IMD business school, points out that removing emotion altogether neuters one element of family business success.
但瑞士洛桑國際管理發(fā)展學(xué)院(IMD)全球家族企業(yè)研究中心主任丹尼絲•凱尼恩-羅維內(nèi)茲(Denise Kenyon-Rouvinez)指出，完全排除情感會(huì)破壞家族企業(yè)成功的一個(gè)內(nèi)在因素。
The offspring of founders are increasingly well prepared. “We often pose [the succession question] as family members versus professionals, as if families aren’t professional,” she told me. “But they may have gone to the best schools in the world and be outstanding.”
創(chuàng)始人的后代正準(zhǔn)備得越來越充分。“我們經(jīng)常把(接班問題)視為家族成員與專業(yè)人士之間的較量，好像家族成員就不可能成為專業(yè)人士一樣，”她對我表示，“但他們可能畢業(yè)于世界最頂級(jí)的學(xué)校，而且表現(xiàn)還很優(yōu)秀。”
Some old assumptions about succession are just a side effect of the business cycle. Handing over to the third generation is often problematic. But many companies have in any case overrun their natural lifespan. Combined with the near-certainty that some of the proliferating branches of the family tree lose interest after a few decades, or decide they need to cash out, dissolution is often unavoidable.
關(guān)于家族企業(yè)接班的一些陳舊的假設(shè)，其實(shí)只是商業(yè)周期的副作用。將企業(yè)交給第三代接班人往往會(huì)出現(xiàn)問題。但許多公司的自然壽命本來就已到頭了。再加上幾乎可以肯定的是，幾十年后，家族中的一些后代將失去興趣，或者認(rèn)為他們需要套現(xiàn)，解散往往不可避免。
The arithmetic can, however, benefit family businesses that survive. Prof Kenyon-Rouvinez has studied the 30-generation, 700-year-old Frescobaldi wine-growing dynasty. In its 29th generation, the family stopped appointing its firstborn sons to leadership positions, and started tapping a wider sibling group.
然而，這其中的算術(shù)規(guī)律有利于生存下來的家族企業(yè)。凱尼恩-羅維內(nèi)茲教授研究了歷經(jīng)30代、擁有700年歷史的葡萄酒商花思蝶(Frescobaldi)家族。在第29代時(shí)，該家族不再任命長子出任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)崗位，而是開始在范圍更廣的兄弟姐妹群體中物色人選。
Similarly, Central Group, the Thai retailer, employs 51 descendants of the company’s founder. It has traditionally drawn on managers and leaders from the large Chirathivat family.
同樣，泰國零售商“中央集團(tuán)”(Central Group)聘用了該集團(tuán)創(chuàng)始人的51名后代。傳統(tǒng)上，該集團(tuán)的管理者和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者都來自龐大的鄭氏家族(Chirathivat family)。
“The company is growing faster than our babies,” third generation chief executive Tos Chirathivat told the Nikkei Asian Review recently. It now selects outside managers, too, but with the important caveat that they should be chosen for how well they fit the family culture.
“公司的擴(kuò)張速度比我們的孩子長得快，”該集團(tuán)第三代首席執(zhí)行官鄭昌(Tos Chirathivat)最近在接受《日經(jīng)亞洲評論》(Nikkei Asian Review)采訪時(shí)表示。如今，該集團(tuán)也從外面選拔管理者，但一個(gè)重要的條件是他們在多大程度上契合該家族的文化。
“Heir underperformance”, as the academics euphemistically call it, is not a myth. The long-running World Management Survey puts family- and founder-owned businesses whose chief executive is also a founder or from the family at the bottom of its ranking of best-managed groups. But implying that heirs are always too selfish or grasping to give up power — or too feeble to hold it — is to underestimate how quickly some family businesses are growing up.
“后代表現(xiàn)欠佳”(學(xué)者們委婉的稱呼)并非虛構(gòu)。運(yùn)行多年的“世界管理調(diào)查”(World Management Survey)將家族及創(chuàng)始人所有的企業(yè)——首席執(zhí)行官也是創(chuàng)始人或家族成員——放在其最佳管理集團(tuán)排行榜的墊底位置。但暗示接班人總是太自私或者太貪心，以至于不想放權(quán)——或者太軟弱以至于無法掌控權(quán)力——就低估了一些家族企業(yè)成長的速度。
