不能簡單看待印度的不平等問題

In his best-selling book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the French economist Thomas Piketty argued that capitalist economies have a natural tendency to incubate highly unequal distributions of income and wealth. Now Mr Piketty has, with Lucas Chancel, written a new paper entitled “Indian Income Inequality, 1922-2014: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj?”.

法國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家托馬斯•皮凱蒂(Thomas Piketty)在其暢銷書《21世紀(jì)資本論》(Capital in the Twenty-First Century)中辯稱，資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)有著孵化高度不平等的收入和財(cái)富分配的自然傾向?，F(xiàn)在皮凱蒂與盧卡斯•錢斯?fàn)?Lucas Chancel)一起撰寫了一篇新的論文，題目是《1922-2014年印度的收入不平等現(xiàn)象：從英國統(tǒng)治到富豪統(tǒng)治?》(Indian Income Inequality, 1922-2014: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj?)。

Using a complex mix of data on income tax, national accounts and household surveys, Messrs Piketty and Chancel conclude that the top 1 per cent of earners in 2014 earned 22 per cent of Indian national income, the highest share since 1922, when income tax was introduced. The share of the top 1 per cent fell sharply between 1951 and 1980, and then rose again in the period 1980-2014, particularly after the beginning of economic liberalisation in 1991.

根據(jù)復(fù)雜的個(gè)人所得稅、國民賬戶和家庭調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，皮凱蒂和錢斯?fàn)柕贸鼋Y(jié)論稱，2014年印度前1%高收入人群獲得了22%的國民收入，是1922年開征個(gè)人所得稅以來最大的份額。這個(gè)人群的收入份額在1951年到1980年間大幅下降，隨后在1980年到2014年間再次上升，尤其是在1991年經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化啟動(dòng)之后。

There are two problems with their argument. One is statistical. The other is their failure to distinguish between different kinds of inequality. Absent such caveats, the paper implies that the era of socialist planning in India was fair, distributionally speaking, and the era of “pro-business, market deregulation policies” that followed unfair. That is a half-truth at best.

他們的論證有兩個(gè)問題。一個(gè)是統(tǒng)計(jì)問題，另一個(gè)是他們未能區(qū)分不同種類的不平等。除了此類問題以外，該文還暗示稱，從分配的角度說，印度的社會(huì)主義計(jì)劃時(shí)代是公平的，隨后的“親商業(yè)的市場去監(jiān)管化政策”時(shí)代是不公平的。這充其量說對了一半。

The authors admit that their mish-mash of survey, tax and national accounts data are “fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties”. So they attempt to buttress this with a series of alternative assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem of “rubbish in, rubbish out” applies to all such modelling.

兩位作者承認(rèn)，他們混合了調(diào)查、稅收和國民賬戶的數(shù)據(jù)“充斥著方法和概念上的困難”。因此他們試圖用一系列替代假設(shè)來佐證。然而，“垃圾進(jìn)、垃圾出”(rubbish in, rubbish out)的問題適用于所有此類模型。

In 1922, over 40 per cent of India was ruled by 500-odd princes, not the British. The princes and their nobility were enormously wealthy, but not subject to British taxes. Inequality in that era was surely much higher than today.

1922年，逾40%的印度地區(qū)被500多位王公而非英國人統(tǒng)治著。這些王公和他們的貴族非常富有，但不用繳納英國稅收。那個(gè)時(shí)代的不平等程度當(dāng)然遠(yuǎn)比現(xiàn)在嚴(yán)重。

Messrs Piketty and Chancel’s use of tax data to judge income is problematic. The tax authorities count capital gains as income. But capital gains do not constitute value addition, and so are excluded from gross domestic product. So, their income/GDP ratio should not include capital gains.

皮凱蒂和錢斯?fàn)柺褂枚愂諗?shù)據(jù)來評估收入是有問題的。稅收當(dāng)局將資本收益視為收入。但資本收益不構(gòu)成增值，因此不算在國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之內(nèi)。因此，他們計(jì)算的收入與GDP比率不應(yīng)包括資本收益。

The authors show that inequality shrank significantly in the era of high taxes and nationalisation and into the 1980s. Did ordinary Indians benefit? Alas, no. The poverty ratio remained virtually unchanged for three decades after independence in 1947, while the population almost doubled. Hence the absolute number of poor people almost doubled in this period.

兩位作者表示，在高稅收和國有化時(shí)代以及進(jìn)入上世紀(jì)80年代不平等程度大幅減輕。普通印度人受益了嗎?唉，他們并沒有受益。在1947年獨(dú)立以后的30年里，貧困率依然基本上沒有變化，而人口幾乎增長了一倍。因此窮人絕對數(shù)量在這個(gè)期間幾乎增長了一倍。

By contrast, while inequality certainly rose in the booming 2000s, 138m people were lifted above the poverty line between 2004 and 2012, an Indian record. Inegalitarian liberalisation accomplished what egalitarian socialism could not.

相比之下，盡管在本世紀(jì)蓬勃發(fā)展的頭十年不平等程度當(dāng)然有所上升，但1.38億人在2004年到2012年間脫貧，這是印度歷史上的最高紀(jì)錄。不平等的自由化做到了主張平等的社會(huì)主義都做不到的事情。

This should come as no surprise. Rapid growth provides opportunities, which can be more important than socialist levelling. The Economic Survey 2010-11 provided consumption Gini coefficients — a measure of equality in which 0 is complete equality and 1 complete inequality — for Indian states. In every state, urban Gini numbers were far higher than rural ones, yet all migration was from relatively egalitarian villages to inegalitarian cities. People voted with their feet for opportunity over equality. The rural Gini (0.17) was lowest in Bihar and Assam, but these were sloughs of despond and stagnation, not egalitarian paradises. Biharis migrated in their millions to richer but more unequal states for work.

人們不應(yīng)感到意外?？焖僭鲩L提供了機(jī)遇，這可能比社會(huì)主義平等更重要?！?010年至2011年經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)查》(Economic Survey 2010-11)提供了印度各邦的消費(fèi)基尼系數(shù)(Gini coefficient)——基尼系數(shù)是一種衡量平等狀況的指標(biāo)，0是完全平等，1是完全不平等。在每個(gè)邦，城市的基尼系數(shù)都遠(yuǎn)高于鄉(xiāng)村的基尼系數(shù)。然而，所有的移民都是從相對平等的村莊來到不平等的城市的。人們用腳投票，支持機(jī)遇而非平等。比哈爾邦和阿薩姆邦的鄉(xiāng)村基尼系數(shù)為0.17，是最低的，但這兩個(gè)邦是令人失望和經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯的泥沼，并非是人人平等的天堂。比哈爾邦有數(shù)百萬人去了更富裕但也更為不平等的邦工作。

The second-highest rural inequality (0.29) was found in Kerala. This is India’s most socially advanced state, with the lowest rates of infant mortality and illiteracy. It also has the highest wage rate and best pupil-teacher ratio. Kerala has gained hugely through globalisation — it sends the most migrant workers to the Gulf and benefits from their remittances. This creates inequality, but its living conditions are far better than in more egalitarian Bihar or Assam.

第二高的鄉(xiāng)村基尼系數(shù)(0.29)出自喀拉拉邦。這是印度社會(huì)發(fā)展程度最為先進(jìn)的邦，擁有最低的嬰兒死亡率和文盲率。它還有最高的薪資水平和最佳的學(xué)生與教師比率?？钜蛉蚧芤娣藴\——該邦前往海灣地區(qū)打工的人數(shù)在印度各邦中是最多的，它從這些工人的匯款中受益。這導(dǎo)致了不平等，但其生活水平遠(yuǎn)高于更為平等的比哈爾邦和阿薩姆邦。

Dalits, once called “untouchables”, are at the very bottom of India’s caste system. Economic liberalisation has generated new business opportunities, creating 3,000 Dalit millionaires. This will show in Messrs Piketty and Chancel’s data as contributing to inequality. But it is the sort of inequality that should be celebrated. India needs more social mobility and rags-to-riches stories.

曾被稱為“賤民”的達(dá)利特(Dalit)處于印度種姓體系的底層。經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化創(chuàng)造了新的商業(yè)機(jī)遇，產(chǎn)生了3000個(gè)達(dá)利特百萬富翁。在皮凱蒂和錢斯?fàn)柕臄?shù)據(jù)當(dāng)中，這會(huì)被證明為導(dǎo)致了不平等。但這是某種應(yīng)該贊揚(yáng)的不平等。印度需要更多的社會(huì)流動(dòng)性和白手起家的故事。

Leaving aside the technical flaws of the Piketty-Chancel analysis, it is true that liberalisation has increased inequality. But it is also true that as liberalisation gathered momentum after 1991, businesses were able to expand at an unprecedented rate. People with skills and access to global markets benefited hugely, while those in rural areas without skills or connectivity lagged far behind.

如果不考慮皮凱蒂和錢斯?fàn)柕姆治鲈诩夹g(shù)上的瑕疵，自由化確實(shí)加劇了不平等。但以下情況同樣是事實(shí)，隨著1991年以后自由化勢頭加劇，企業(yè)能夠以前所未有的速度擴(kuò)張。擁有技能和能夠進(jìn)入全球市場的人受益巨大，而農(nóng)村地區(qū)缺乏技能或門路的人落在了后面。

This massive inequality of opportunity is something Messrs Piketty and Chancel do not address. Soaking the rich is not the answer — we learnt that from the socialist era. India needs a decent school, health centre, road, electricity supply and internet connection in every village. It needs uncorrupt, accountable and skilled government staff. Economic liberalisation has achieved much, but it should now be supplemented by high-quality public goods.

這種機(jī)遇上的巨大不平等，皮凱蒂和錢斯?fàn)柌]有探討。向富人課以重稅不是辦法——我們從社會(huì)主義時(shí)代就知道這一點(diǎn)。印度需要在每個(gè)村莊建設(shè)像樣的學(xué)校、衛(wèi)生中心、道路、電力供應(yīng)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)連接。它需要廉潔、負(fù)責(zé)和有能力的政府職員。經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化取得了很大成就，但現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該由優(yōu)質(zhì)的公共產(chǎn)品來補(bǔ)充。

The writer is a research fellow at the Cato Institute

本文作者是加圖研究所(Cato Institute)的研究員