數(shù)字時(shí)代要求反思競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論

Anxiety about the health of competition in the US economy — and elsewhere — is growing. The concern may be well founded but taking forceful action will require economists to provide some practical ways of proving and measuring the harm caused by increasing market power in the digital economy.

對(duì)美國(guó)(和其他地方)經(jīng)濟(jì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局健康狀況的焦慮正在加劇。這些擔(dān)憂或許有理有據(jù)，但如果要采取有力舉措，就需要經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們拿出一些切實(shí)可行的方式，來(lái)證明和衡量數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)中日益增強(qiáng)的市場(chǎng)支配力造成的危害。

The forces driving concentration do not affect the US alone. In all digital markets, the cost structure of high upfront costs and low additional or marginal costs means there are large economies of scale. The broad impact of digital technology has been to increase the scope of the markets many businesses can hope to reach.

推動(dòng)集中化的力量并非只影響美國(guó)。在所有的數(shù)字市場(chǎng)中，高前期成本和低附加/邊際成本的成本結(jié)構(gòu)意味著，存在著較大的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)。數(shù)字技術(shù)的整體影響是擴(kuò)大了許多企業(yè)能夠企及的市場(chǎng)范圍。

In pre-digital days, the question an economist would ask is whether the efficiencies gained by big or merging companies would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Another key question was whether it would still be possible for new entrants to break into the market.

在前數(shù)字時(shí)代，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家提出的問(wèn)題是，大企業(yè)或者正在合并的企業(yè)提高的效率，是否會(huì)以降低價(jià)格的形式傳遞給消費(fèi)者?另外一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是，新入行者是否還有可能進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)?

Digital platforms make these questions harder to answer. The basic economic theory, developed by Jean Tirole and others, establishes that in such markets one “side” will cross-subsidise the other. So the signal prices send about competition is completely different from in a traditional market. Platforms also generally expand into neighbouring markets, so the standard market definition exercises done by competition authorities are doubly uninformative.

數(shù)字平臺(tái)使這些問(wèn)題變得更難以回答。按照讓•梯若爾(Jean Tirole)等人發(fā)展出的基本經(jīng)濟(jì)理論，在數(shù)字時(shí)代的市場(chǎng)中，一“側(cè)”將對(duì)另一側(cè)形成交叉補(bǔ)貼。因此，在這類市場(chǎng)上，價(jià)格傳遞的有關(guān)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的信號(hào)與傳統(tǒng)市場(chǎng)截然不同。數(shù)字平臺(tái)通常還會(huì)擴(kuò)張進(jìn)入鄰近市場(chǎng)，因此競(jìng)爭(zhēng)管理當(dāng)局定義標(biāo)準(zhǔn)市場(chǎng)的做法更加缺乏依據(jù)。

Big digital companies argue that the consumer benefit they provide through free services is immense. So where is the harm? 數(shù)字領(lǐng)域的大公司主張，它們通過(guò)免費(fèi)服務(wù)提供了巨大的消費(fèi)者福利，那么危害在哪里?

They rely heavily too on competition among themselves, and the threat of digital disruption: just as Facebook quickly toppled MySpace, so it could be toppled in turn. They argue that competition for the market is intense, and some competition experts agree.

這些公司還非常依賴相互之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，以及數(shù)字顛覆的威脅：就如Facebook迅速顛覆了MySpace，F(xiàn)acebook本身也可能被顛覆。這些公司提出，數(shù)字市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈，一些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)專家也認(rèn)同這一點(diǎn)。

This might be right, but we do not know. Economists are letting down competition regulators in failing to provide the tools for evaluating in specific cases the claim that — in a world of significant returns to scale and network effects — bigger is better for everyone.

這種說(shuō)法或許正確，但我們不得而知。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們正使競(jìng)爭(zhēng)管理當(dāng)局感到失望，因?yàn)樗麄兡貌怀鲈诰唧w個(gè)案中評(píng)判如下主張的工具：在規(guī)模和網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)獲得豐厚回報(bào)的世界，更大對(duì)每一個(gè)人都更好。

One much-needed tool is how to assess consumer benefits. 我們亟需的一件工具是消費(fèi)者福利的評(píng)估方法。

Google and Facebook provide services consumers greatly value without taking money directly from them; but advertisers place great value on the services too, and their payments will be passed on ultimately to consumers in the price of whatever is being advertised. How high is that price? The network effects of digital platforms do produce real economic welfare gains, but nobody knows how big these are or who captures them.

谷歌(Google)和Facebook提供消費(fèi)者非常重視的服務(wù)，并且沒(méi)有從消費(fèi)者那里直接收取費(fèi)用;但廣告商也非常重視這些服務(wù)，它們?yōu)檫@些服務(wù)支付的費(fèi)用最終將以廣告產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的價(jià)格的形式轉(zhuǎn)嫁給消費(fèi)者。這個(gè)價(jià)格有多高?數(shù)字平臺(tái)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)的確會(huì)產(chǎn)生真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利，但沒(méi)人知道這些經(jīng)濟(jì)福利有多大，也沒(méi)人知道誰(shuí)獲得了這些福利。

A second issue is how to take into account the interactions between markets, given that most platforms and tech companies steadily expand into other activities and markets. There has probably been too little focus in antitrust policy for a long time on the purchasing power of big companies.

第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是如何考慮市場(chǎng)的相互作用，考慮到大多數(shù)數(shù)字平臺(tái)和科技公司正穩(wěn)步擴(kuò)張進(jìn)入其他活動(dòng)和市場(chǎng)。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，反壟斷政策對(duì)大公司購(gòu)買力的關(guān)注很可能太少了。

A third issue, perhaps the most important, is the effect increasing concentration has on incentives to innovate and invest. The economic welfare gains from innovation will usually dwarf the gains from lower prices. Competition economics has always been poor at trying to quantify these relative gains, but the stakes are high now that innovation is seen as one of the main drivers of competition. How can potential challengers develop new technologies to topple an incumbent if they have to compete with an apparently zero price? For that matter, how will investment in physical networks or content get funded if an incumbent using the network and content captures all the profit downstream?

第三個(gè)，或許也是最重要的一個(gè)問(wèn)題是，集中化程度提高對(duì)創(chuàng)新和投資的激勵(lì)力量有什么影響?創(chuàng)新帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利通常會(huì)超過(guò)降低價(jià)格帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)一直無(wú)法很好地在量化這一差值，但既然創(chuàng)新被視為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主要推動(dòng)力之一，這個(gè)差值就涉及重大利害關(guān)系。如果潛在的挑戰(zhàn)者不得不與貌似為零的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，他們?cè)趺囱邪l(fā)新技術(shù)來(lái)推翻現(xiàn)有企業(yè)?而且，如果現(xiàn)有企業(yè)利用網(wǎng)絡(luò)和內(nèi)容捕獲了所有下游利潤(rùn)，如何獲得資金投資于物理網(wǎng)絡(luò)或者內(nèi)容?

Reversing the kind of increased concentration seen in the US takes a significant commitment of political capital and bureaucratic energy. These are more likely to be forthcoming if the analysis and evidence is there to back them up. It is up to the economists to provide the ammunition.

扭轉(zhuǎn)美國(guó)出現(xiàn)的這種集中化程度提高，需要投入可觀的政治資本，官僚體系也需要投入大量精力。如果有相關(guān)分析和證據(jù)作為依據(jù)，當(dāng)局將更有可能采取行動(dòng)。提供這些彈藥是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們的責(zé)任。

The writer is professor of economics at the University of Manchester

本文作者是曼徹斯特大學(xué)(University of Manchester)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授