破解中國債務(wù)謎團(tuán)

Concerns about China’s ballooning debt indicators have been cycling on and off for nearly a decade. BIS put out an alert in September about China’s increasing “credit to GDP gap,” a warning that the pace was excessive relative to historical trends. Add to this worry the dependence of some banks on wholesale borrowing and re-emergence of shadow-banking and it is easy to understand why some observers have raised the possibility of a destabilising “Lehman moment.”

近10年來，對(duì)中國日益攀升的債務(wù)指標(biāo)的擔(dān)憂一直在周而復(fù)始地出現(xiàn)。今年9月，國際清算銀行(BIS)就中國不斷增大的“信貸規(guī)模/GDP缺口”(Credit-to-GDP gap)發(fā)出警告，稱其增大的節(jié)奏相對(duì)于歷史趨勢過高了。加劇這種擔(dān)心的是，一些銀行依賴批發(fā)借款，而影子銀行卷土重來。因此，不難理解一些觀察人士為何提出中國出現(xiàn)破壞穩(wěn)定的“雷曼時(shí)刻”(Lehman moment)的可能性。

Yet predictions of an imminent collapse seem to come and go with the seasons. Part of the explanation is that China’s debt is largely the result of state-owned banks lending to state entities. Given the government’s strong financial position, there is less risk that isolated defaults or bank runs could derail the financial system. China’s problem also differs from other crisis cases because of the unique role that escalating land prices have played in shaping debt indicators and asset values.

然而，有關(guān)馬上就要崩潰的預(yù)測似乎就像季節(jié)那樣來來去去。對(duì)此，部分解釋是中國的債務(wù)在很大程度上是國有銀行向國有實(shí)體放貸的結(jié)果?？紤]到中國政府強(qiáng)大的財(cái)政實(shí)力，孤立的違約或銀行擠兌事件搞亂金融體系的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較低。此外，由于中國日漸攀升的地價(jià)在債務(wù)指標(biāo)和資產(chǎn)價(jià)值現(xiàn)狀的形成中扮演著獨(dú)特角色，中國的問題也與其他危機(jī)案例不太一樣。

The impact of rising land prices is unique to China because an extensive private property market only emerged after housing was privatised and land auctions were initiated a decade ago. In the aftermath, credit expansion supported a fivefold increase in land prices in the major cities (eightfold in dollar terms). This in turn has caused fixed asset investments to soar from 45 to 80 per cent of GDP. But what counts as investment for GDP purposes is gross fixed capital formation which excludes the value of land and transfers of existing property and as a share of GDP has hovered around 45 per cent. While the credit surge has driven up debt indicators, it has not spurred GDP growth.

地價(jià)攀升的影響是中國獨(dú)有的現(xiàn)象，這是因?yàn)橹袊笠?guī)模私人房產(chǎn)市場只是在10年前住房私有化和土地拍賣啟動(dòng)之后才出現(xiàn)的。在那之后，信貸擴(kuò)張支撐了大城市地價(jià)上漲五倍(以美元計(jì)算漲幅高達(dá)八倍)。這進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致固定資產(chǎn)與國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)之比從45%激增至80%。不過，就GDP計(jì)算而言，投資指的是固定資本形成總額，該指標(biāo)剔除土地價(jià)值和現(xiàn)有物業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)讓，其與GDP之比一直徘徊在45%左右。盡管信貸激增推高了債務(wù)指標(biāo)，但并未刺激GDP的增長。

Nevertheless, the credit expansion has contributed to what economists often refer to positively as “financial deepening” as markets are discovering the value of land based assets (housing and commercial property) formerly hidden in a socialist system. This suggests that the debt problem might be overstated. A more informative risk indicator might be the ratio of debt to asset values. This ratio was highlighted recently by Nomura analysts. As seen in Figure 1 (below) this ratio has been declining steadily over the past decade because of the increasing value of land based assets, even as the debt-to-GDP ratio has soared. Whether this might eventually trigger a financial crisis depends on the sustainability of these asset values.

不過，隨著市場不斷發(fā)現(xiàn)此前埋沒于社會(huì)主義制度的基于土地的資產(chǎn)(住房和商用物業(yè))的價(jià)值，信貸擴(kuò)張推動(dòng)了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們往往給予正面評(píng)價(jià)的“金融深化”。這似乎表明債務(wù)問題也許言過其實(shí)了。更說明問題的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)指標(biāo)或許是債務(wù)與資產(chǎn)價(jià)值之比。野村證券(Nomura)分析師最近曾強(qiáng)調(diào)這一比率。如圖1所示，由于基于土地的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值不斷攀升，過去10年這一比率不斷下降，盡管債務(wù)與GDP之比出現(xiàn)飆升。最終是否會(huì)引發(fā)金融危機(jī)，要看這些資產(chǎn)價(jià)值的可持續(xù)性。

Two groups have been affected: households and enterprises. In the case of households, housing affordability as measured by the ratio of personal incomes to housing prices has been improving and excess inventories have been declining. Thus the possibility of a major collapse in housing prices is low. Even if housing prices did fall significantly, most households have built up substantial equity positions backed by substantial savings, so the likelihood of a destabilising impact on the financial system is limited.

兩個(gè)群體受到影響：家庭和企業(yè)。從家庭方面來說，以個(gè)人收入與房價(jià)之比衡量的住房負(fù)擔(dān)能力一直在提升，過高庫存一直在下滑。因此，房價(jià)嚴(yán)重崩盤的可能性很低。即使房價(jià)確實(shí)大幅下跌，多數(shù)家庭也在大量儲(chǔ)蓄的支持下，建立了相當(dāng)大的股權(quán)頭寸，因此金融體系受到破壞穩(wěn)定的沖擊的可能性十分有限。

But rising asset values can have significant negative implications for enterprises if returns on these assets do not keep up with debt servicing costs. Profitability is not yet a generalised problem for private companies whose returns on assets are currently about twice that of state-owned (see Figure 2). Before the financial crisis, however, rates of return for the two groups were nearly the same. The divergence came from the government’s periodic stimulus efforts which led to an excessive expansion in the production capacity of selected state firms.

但是，不斷攀升的資產(chǎn)價(jià)值可能給企業(yè)帶來顯著負(fù)面影響——如果這些資產(chǎn)的回報(bào)趕不上償債成本。對(duì)民營企業(yè)來說，盈利能力還不是普遍問題，它們目前的資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率是國有企業(yè)的兩倍(參見圖2)。然而，在金融危機(jī)之前，兩者的回報(bào)率幾乎相同。差距的拉大源自政府的周期性刺激努力，這些努力導(dǎo)致被選中的國企生產(chǎn)力過度擴(kuò)張。

A consequence has been the emergence of a group of state-owned enterprises, referred to as “zombies,” that are generating huge losses. These are typically large companies operating in heavy industries, energy and construction related activities. The bad part of the problem is that most of the affected companies are concentrated in the already depressed “rust belt” regions making the solution politically more difficult. In some cases, potentially hundreds of thousands of workers need to be relocated and entire towns may become non-viable. The good part of the problem is that this is not a widespread phenomenon affecting the vast majority of companies which are private.

由此導(dǎo)致的一個(gè)后果是出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)被稱為“僵尸”企業(yè)的虧損嚴(yán)重的國企群體。這些企業(yè)往往是經(jīng)營重工業(yè)、能源和建筑相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)的大企業(yè)。問題的糟糕之處在于，多數(shù)受影響企業(yè)集中于已經(jīng)不景氣的“銹帶”老工業(yè)區(qū)，在政治上加大了解決難度。在某些情況下，潛在有數(shù)十萬工人需要重新安置，整個(gè)城鎮(zhèn)可能難以為繼。問題的有利之處則在于，這不是一種影響在數(shù)量上占絕大多數(shù)的民營企業(yè)的普遍現(xiàn)象。

The authorities reissued instructions in October to have these zombie companies go bankrupt and their assets liquidated. The needed restructuring is now under way with some recent double-digit cuts in coal and steel production, recapitalisation of banks and outflows of workers to other regions. The increase in defaults suggests that the authorities are taking things more seriously. This has elevated producer prices to positive levels after years of decline. The result is an uptick in profit margins and increasing corporate revenues.

今年10月，中國當(dāng)局再次發(fā)出指示，讓這些僵尸企業(yè)破產(chǎn)并將其資產(chǎn)清盤。目前正在推進(jìn)必要的重組：煤炭和鋼鐵產(chǎn)量最近削減幅度達(dá)到兩位數(shù)，銀行開展資本重組，工人外遷至其他地區(qū)。違約案例增多似乎表明，當(dāng)局正在更加認(rèn)真地處理問題。這些舉措令生產(chǎn)者價(jià)格指數(shù)在多年下滑之后被推升至正數(shù)區(qū)間。結(jié)果是利潤率上升，企業(yè)營收不斷增加。

In sum what is seen by some as a generalised debt problem is actually more of a restructuring issue involving downsizing of a subset of state-owned enterprises. But much more action is needed in this regard before one can be confident that the worst is over.

總之，一些人眼中的普遍債務(wù)問題，實(shí)際上在更大程度上是一個(gè)重組問題，涉及對(duì)一部分國企進(jìn)行瘦身。但是，這方面還需要采取多得多的行動(dòng)，才能讓人確信最壞的時(shí)期已經(jīng)過去。

The author is a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment, former World Bank Director for China and author of the forthcoming ‘Cracking the China Conundrum’.

本文作者為美國卡內(nèi)基國際和平基金會(huì)(Carnegie Endowment)高級(jí)研究員，曾任世界銀行(World Bank)中國業(yè)務(wù)局局長并著有即將出版的《破解中國難題》(Cracking the China Conundrum)一書