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雙語(yǔ)·股票大作手回憶錄 第二十章

所屬教程:譯林版·股票大作手回憶錄

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2022年05月09日

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I MYSELF never spoke to any of the great stock manipulators that the Street still talks about.I don't mean leaders;I mean manipulators.They were all before my time,although when I first came to New York,James R.Keene,greatest of them all,was in his prime.But I was a mere youngster then,exclusively concerned with duplicating,in a reputable broker's office,the success I had enjoyed in the bucket shops of my native city.And,then,too,at the time Keene was busy with the U.S.Steel stocks—his manipulative masterpiece—I had no experience with manipulation,no real knowledge of it or of its value or meaning,and,for that matter,no great need of such knowledge.If I thought about it at all I suppose I must have regarded it as a well-dressed form of thimble-rigging,of which the lowbrow form was such tricks as had been tried on me in the bucket shops.Such talk as I since have heard on the subject has consisted in great part of surmises and suspicions;of guesses rather than intelligent analyses.

More than one man who knew him well has told me that Keene was the boldest and most brilliant operator that ever worked in Wall Street.That is saying a great deal,for there have been some great traders.Their names are now all but forgotten,but nevertheless they were kings in their day—for a day!They were pulled up out of obscurity into the sunlight of financial fame by the ticker tape—and the little paper ribbon didn't prove strong enough to keep them suspended there long enough for them to become historical fixtures.At all events Keene was by all odds the best manipulator of his day—and it was a long and exciting day.

He capitalized his knowledge of the game,his experience as an operator and his talents when he sold his services to the Havemeyer brothers,who wanted him to develop a market for the Sugar stocks.He was broke at the time or he would have continued to trade on his own hook;and he was some plunger!He was successful with Sugar;made the shares trading favourites,and that made them easily vendible.After that,he was asked time and again to take charge of pools.I am told that in these pool operations he never asked or accepted a fee,but paid for his share like the other members of the pool.The market conduct of the stock,of course,was exclusively in his charge.Often there was talk of treachery—on both sides.His feud with the Whitney-Ryan clique arose from such accusations.It is not difficult for a manipulator to be misunderstood by his associates.They don't see his needs as he himself does.I know this from my own experience.

It is a matter of regret that Keene did not leave an accurate record of his greatest exploit—the successful manipulation of the U.S.Steel shares in the spring of 1901.As I understand it,Keene never had an interview with J.P.Morgan about it.Morgan's firm dealt with or through Talbot J.Taylor & Co.,at whose office Keene made his headquarters.Talbot Taylor was Keene's son-in-law.I am assured that Keene's fee for his Work consisted of the pleasure he derived from the work.That he made millions trading in the market he helped to put up that spring is well known.He told a friend of mine that in the course of a few weeks he sold in the open market for the underwriters' syndicate more than seven hundred and fifty thousand shares.Not bad when you consider two things:That they were new and untried stocks of a corporation whose capitalization was greater than the entire debt of the United States at that time;and second,that men like D.G.Reid,W.B.Leeds,the Moore brothers,Henry Phipps,H.C.Frick and the other Steel magnates also sold hundreds of thousands of shares to the public at the same time in the same market that Keene helped to create.

Of course,general conditions favoured him.Not only actual business but sentiment and his unlimited financial backing made possible his success.What we had was not merely a big bull market but a boom and a state of mind not likely to be seen again.The undigested-securities panic came later,when Steel common,which Keene had marked up to 55 in 1901,sold at 10 in 1903 and at 8 in 1904.

We can't analyse Keene's manipulative campaigns.His books are not available;the adequately detailed record is nonexistent.For example,it would be interesting to see how he worked in Amalgamated Copper.H.H.Rogers and William Rockefeller had tried to dispose of their surplus stock in the market and had failed.Finally they asked Keene to market their line,and he agreed.Bear in mind that H.H.Rogers was one of the ablest business men of his day in Wall Street and that William Rockefeller was the boldest speculator of the entire Standard Oil coterie.They had practically unlimited resources and vast prestige as well as years of experience in the stock-market game.And yet they had to go to Keene.I mention this to show you that there are some tasks which it requires a specialist to perform.Here was a widely touted stock,sponsored by America's greatest capitalists,that could not be sold except at a great sacrifice of money and prestige.Rogers and Rockefeller were intelligent enough to decide that Keene alone might help them.

Keene began to work at once.He had a bull market to work in and sold two hundred and twenty thousand shares of Amalgamated at around par.After he disposed of the insiders' line the public kept on buying and the price went ten points higher.Indeed the insiders got bullish on the stock they had sold when they saw how eagerly the public was taking it.There was a story that Rogers actually advised Keene to go long of Amalgamated.It is scarcely credible that Rogers meant to unload on Keene.He was too shrewd a man not to know that Keene was no bleating lamb.Keene worked as he always did—that is,doing his big selling on the way down after the big rise.Of course his tactical moves were directed by his needs and by the minor currents that changed from day to day.In the stock market,as in warfare,it is well to keep in mind the difference between strategy and tactics.

One of Keene's confidential men—he is the best fly fisherman I know—told me only the other day that during the Amalgamated campaign Keene would find himself almost out of stock one day—that is,out of the stock he had been forced to take in marking up the price;and on the next day he would buy back thousands of shares.On the day after that,he would sell on balance.Then he would leave the market absolutely alone,to see how it would take care of itself and also to accustom it to do so.When it came to the actual marketing of the line he did what I told you:he sold it on the way down.The trading public is always looking for a rally,and,besides,there is the covering by the shorts.

The man who was closest to Keene during that deal told me that after Keene sold the Rogers-Rockefeller line for something like twenty or twenty-five million dollars in cash Rogers sent him a check for two hundred thousand.This reminds you of the millionaire's wife who gave the Metropolitan Opera House scrub-woman fifty cents reward for finding the one-hundred-thousand-dollar pearl necklace.Keene sent the check back with a polite note saying he was not a stock broker and that he was glad to have been of some service to them.They kept the check and wrote him that they would be glad to work with him again.Shortly after that it was that H.H.Rogers gave Keene the friendly tip to buy Amalgamated at around 130!

A brilliant operator,James R.Keene!His private secretary told me that when the market was going his way Mr.Keene was irascible;and those who knew him say his irascibility was expressed in sardonic phrases that lingered long in the memory of his hearers.But when he was losing he was in the best of humour,a polished man of the world,agreeable,epigrammatic,interesting.

He had in superlative degree the qualities of mind that are associated with successful speculators anywhere.That he did not argue with the tape is plain.He was utterly fearless but never reckless.He could and did turn in a twinkling,if he found he was wrong.

Since his day there have been so many changes in Stock Exchange rules and so much more rigorous enforcement of old rules,so many new taxes on stock sales and profits,and so on,that the game seems different.Devices that Keene could use with skill and profit can no longer be utilised.Also,we are assured,the business morality of Wall Street is on a higher plane.Nevertheless it is fair to say that in any period of our financial history Keene would have been a great manipulator because he was a great stock operator and knew the game of speculation from the ground up.He achieved what he did because conditions at the time permitted him to do so.He would have been as successful in his undertakings in 1922 as he was in 1901 or in 1876,when he first came to New York from California and made nine million dollars in two years.There are men whose gait is far quicker than the mob's.They are bound to lead—no matter how much the mob changes.

As a matter of fact,the change is by no means as radical as you'd imagine.The rewards are not so great,for it is no longer pioneer work and therefore it is not pioneer's pay.But in certain respects manipulation is easier than it was;in other ways much harder than in Keene's day.

There is no question that advertising is an art,and manipulation is the art of advertising through the medium of the tape.The tape should tell the story the manipulator wishes its readers to see.The truer the story the more convincing it is bound to be,and the more convincing it is the better the advertising is.A manipulator today,for instance,has not only to make a stock look strong but also to make it be strong.Manipulation therefore must be based on sound trading principles.That is what made Keene such a marvellous manipulator;he was a consummate trader to begin with.

The word“manipulation”has come to have an ugly sound.It needs an alias.I do not think there is anything so very mysterious or crooked about the process itself when it has for an object the selling of a stock in bulk,provided,of course,that such operations are not accompanied by misrepresentation.There is little question that a manipulator necessarily seeks his buyers among speculators.He turns to men who are looking for big returns on their capital and are therefore willing to run a greater than normal business risk.I can't have much sympathy for the man who,knowing this,nevertheless blames others for his own failure to make easy money.He is a devil of a clever fellow when he wins.But when he loses money the other fellow was a crook;a manipulator!In such moments and from such lips the word connotes the use of marked cards.But this is not so.

Usually the object of manipulation is to develop marketability—that is,the ability to dispose of fair-sized blocks at some price at any time.Of course a pool,by reason of a reversal of general market conditions,may find itself unable to sell except at a sacrifice too great to be pleasing.They then may decide to employ a professional,believing that his skill and experience will enable him to conduct an orderly retreat instead of suffering an appalling rout.

You will notice that I do not speak of manipulation designed to permit considerable accumulation of a stock as cheaply as possible,as,for instance,in buying for control,because this does not happen often nowadays.

When Jay Gould wished to cinch his control of Western Union and decided to buy a big block of the stock,Washington E.Connor,who had not been seen on the floor of the Stock Exchange for years,suddenly showed up in person at the Western Union post.He began to bid for Western Union.The traders to a man laughed—at his stupidity in thinking them so simple—and they cheerfully sold him all the stock he wanted to buy.It was too raw a trick,to think he could put up the price by acting as though Mr.Gould wanted to buy Western Union.Was that manipulation?I think I can only answer that by saying“No;and yes!”

In the majority of cases the object of manipulation is,as I said,to sell stock to the public at the best possible price.It is not alone a question of selling but of distributing.It is obviously better in every way for a stock to be held by a thousand people than by one man—better for the market in it.So it is not alone the sale at a good price but the character of the distribution that a manipulator must consider.

There is no sense in marking up the price to a very high level if you cannot induce the public to take it off your hands later.Whenever inexperienced manipulators try to unload at the top and fail,old-timers look mighty wise and tell you that you can lead a horse to water but you cannot make him drink.Original devils!As a matter of fact,it is well to remember a rule of manipulation,a rule that Keene and his able predecessors well knew.It is this:Stocks are manipulated to the highest point possible and then sold to the public on the way down.

Let me begin at the beginning.Assume that there is some one—an underwriting syndicate or a pool or an individual—that has a block of stock which it is desired to sell at the best price possible.It is a stock duly listed on the New York Stock Exchange.The best place for selling it ought to be the open market,and the best buyer ought to be the general public.The negotiations for the sale are in charge of a man.He—or some present or former associate—has tried to sell the stock on the Stock Exchange and has not succeeded.He is—or soon becomes—sufficiently familiar with stock-market operations to realize that more experience and greater aptitude for the work are needed than he possesses.He knows personally or by hearsay several men who have been successful in their handling of similar deals,and he decides to avail himself of their professional skill.He seeks one of them as he would seek a physician if he were ill or an engineer if he needed that kind of expert.

Suppose he has heard of me as a man who knows the game.Well,I take it that he tries to find out all he can about me.He then arranges for an interview,and in due time calls at my office.

Of course,the chances are that I know about the stock and what it represents.It is my business to know.That is how I make my living.My visitor tells me what he and his associates wish to do,and asks me to undertake the deal.

It is then my turn to talk.I ask for whatever information I deem necessary to give me a clear understanding of what I am asked to undertake.I determine the value and estimate the market possibilities of that stock.That and my reading of current conditions in turn help me to gauge the likelihood of success for the proposed operation.

If my information inclines me to a favourable view I accept the proposition and tell him then and there what my terms will be for my services.If he in turn accepts my terms—the honorarium and the conditions—I begin my work at once.

I generally ask and receive calls on a block of stock.I insist upon graduated calls as the fairest to all concerned.The price of the call begins at a little below the prevailing market price and goes up;say,for example,that I get calls on one hundred thousand shares and the stock is quoted at 40.I begin with a call for some thousands of shares at 35,another at 37,another at 40,and at 45 and 50,and so on up to 75 or 80.

If as the result of my professional work—my manipulation—the price goes up,and if at the highest level there is a good demand for the stock so that I can sell fair-sized blocks of it I of course call the stock.I am making money;but so are my clients making money.This is as it should be.If my skill is what they are paying for they ought to get value.Of course,there are times when a pool may be wound up at a loss,but that is seldom,for I do not undertake the work unless I see my way clear to a profit.This year I was not so fortunate in one or two deals,and I did not make a profit.There are reasons,but that is another story,to be told later—perhaps.

The first step in a bull movement in a stock is to advertise the fact that there is a bull movement on.Sounds silly,doesn't it?Well,think a moment.It isn't as silly as it sounded,is it?The most effective way to advertise what,in effect,are your honourable intentions is to make the stock active and strong.After all is said and done,the greatest publicity agent in the wide world is the ticker,and by far the best advertising medium is the tape.I do not need to put out any literature for my clients.I do not have to inform the daily press as to the value of the stock or to work the financial reviews for notices about the company's prospects.Neither do I have to get a following.I accomplish all these highly desirable things by merely making the stock active.When there is activity there is a synchronous demand for explanations;and that means,of course,that the necessary reasons—for publication—supply themselves without the slightest aid from me.

Activity is all that the floor traders ask.They will buy or sell any stock at any level if only there is a free market for it.They will deal in thousands of shares wherever they see activity,and their aggregate capacity is considerable.It necessarily happen that they constitute the manipulator's first crop of buyers.They will follow you all the way up and they thus are a great help at all the stages of the operation.I understand that James R.Keene used habitually to employ the most active of the room traders,both to conceal the source of the manipulation and also because he knew that they were by far the best business-spreaders and tip-distributors.He often gave calls to them—verbal calls—above the market,so that they might do some helpful work before they could cash in.He made them earn their profit.To get a professional following I myself have never had to do more than to make a stock active.Traders don't ask for more.It is well,of course,to remember that these professionals on the floor of the Exchange buy stocks with the intention of selling them at a profit.They do not insist on its being a big profit;but it must be a quick profit.

I make the stock active in order to draw the attention of speculators to it,for the reasons I have given.I buy it and I sell it and the traders follow suit.The selling pressure is not apt to be strong where a man has as much speculatively held stock sewed up—in calls—as I insist on having.The buying,therefore,prevails over the selling,and the public follows the lead not so much of the manipulator as of the room traders.It comes in as a buyer.This highly desirable demand I fill—that is,I sell stock on balance.If the demand is what it ought to be it will absorb more than the amount of stock I was compelled to accumulate in the earlier stages of the manipulation;and when this happens I sell the stock short—that is,technically.In other words,I sell more stock than I actually hold.It is perfectly safe for me to do so since I am really selling against my calls.Of course,when the demand from the public slackens,the stock ceases to advance.Then I wait.

Say,then,that the stock has ceased to advance.There comes a weak day.The entire market may develop a reactionary tendency or some sharp-eyed trader my perceive that there are no buying orders to speak of in my stock,and he sells it,and his fellows follow.Whatever the reason may be,my stock starts to go down.Well,I begin to buy it.I give it the support that a stock ought to have if it is in good odour with its own sponsors.And more:I am able to support it without accumulating it—that is,without increasing the amount I shall have to sell later on.Observe that I do this without decreasing my financial resources.Of course what I am really doing is covering stock I sold short at higher prices when the demand from the public or from the traders or from both enabled me to do it.It is always well to make it plain to the traders—and to the public,also—that there is a demand for the stock on the way down.That tends to check both reckless short selling by the professionals and liquidation by frightened holders—which is the selling you usually see when a stock gets weaker and weaker,which in turn is what a stock does when it is not supported.These covering purchases of mine constitute what I call the stabilising process.

As the market broadens I of course sell stock on the way up,but never enough to check the rise.This is in strict accordance with my stabilising plans.It is obvious that the more stock I sell on a reasonable and orderly advance the more I encourage the conservative speculators,who are more numerous than the reckless room traders;and in addition the more support I shall be able to give to the stock on the inevitable weak days.By always being short I always am in a position to support the stock without danger to myself.As a rule I begin my selling at a price that will show me a profit.But I often sell without having a profit,simply to create or to increase what I may call my riskless buying power.My business is not alone to put up the price or to sell a big block of stock for a client but to make money for myself.That is why I do not ask any clients to finance my operations.My fee is contingent upon my success.

Of course what I have described is not my invariable practice.I neither have nor adhere to an inflexible system.I modify my terms and conditions according to circumstances.

A stock which it is desired to distribute should be manipulated to the highest possible point and then sold.I repeat this both because it is fundamental and because the public apparently believes that the selling is all done at the top.Sometimes a stock gets waterlogged,as it were;it doesn't go up.That is the time to sell.The price naturally will go down on your selling rather further than you wish,but you can generally nurse it back.As long as a stock that I am manipulating goes up on my buying I know I am all hunky,and if need be I buy it with confidence and use my own money without fear—precisely as I would any other stock that acts the same way.It is the line of least resistance.You remember my trading theories about that line,don't you?Well,when the price line of least resistance is established I follow it,not because I am manipulating that particular stock at that particular moment but because I am a stock operator at all times.

When my buying does not put the stock up I stop buying and then proceed to sell it down;and that also is exactly what I would do with that same stock if I did not happen to be manipulating it.The principal marketing of the stock,as you know,is done on the way down.It is perfectly astonishing how much stock a man can get rid of on a decline.

I repeat that at no time during the manipulation do I forget to be a stock trader.My problems as a manipulator,after all,are the same that confront me as an operator.All manipulation comes to an end when the manipulator cannot make a stock do what he wants it to do.When the stock you are manipulating doesn't act as it should,quit.Don't argue with the tape.Do not seek to lure the profit back.Quit while the quitting is good—and cheap.

我從來(lái)沒(méi)跟現(xiàn)在還被華爾街津津樂(lè)道的那些股市高手說(shuō)過(guò)話,我指的不是領(lǐng)袖,而是大作手。他們都是我炒股的這個(gè)時(shí)代之前的人。不過(guò),我初次到達(dá)紐約時(shí),所有作手中最偉大的人詹姆斯·凱恩正春風(fēng)得意。可那時(shí)我只是個(gè)年輕人,只關(guān)心怎么樣在一家靠譜的股票公司,做出當(dāng)年在對(duì)賭行那樣的成就來(lái)。而且,凱恩當(dāng)時(shí)正忙于炒作美國(guó)鋼鐵公司的股票,這屬于他的炒股杰作。我那時(shí)候還沒(méi)有炒作經(jīng)驗(yàn),也沒(méi)有真正了解炒作的價(jià)值與意義,而且對(duì)炒作的知識(shí)也沒(méi)什么需求。如果我那時(shí)能想到炒作,那也是因?yàn)槲野殉醋骺醋饕环N高級(jí)的欺騙手段。對(duì)賭行用在我身上的那些手段都是低級(jí)的騙術(shù)。自那時(shí)起,我聽(tīng)到的有關(guān)炒作的話,都是推測(cè)或者質(zhì)疑,猜的成分要高于理性分析的成分。

與凱恩很熟悉的人對(duì)我說(shuō)過(guò)很多次,凱恩是華爾街上自古以來(lái)最精明、最有魄力的作手。這一點(diǎn)的意義很重大,因?yàn)閰柡巧芏?,如今都被人們所遺忘,他們叱咤江湖的時(shí)候,都是國(guó)王一般的顯赫,在某一天都是國(guó)王。他們依靠報(bào)價(jià)牌,從毫不知名逐漸成長(zhǎng)于金融界,最后創(chuàng)造了名氣??赡切⌒〉牟噬珗?bào)價(jià)紙牌沒(méi)有多大的吸引力,不能讓他們?cè)谀抢锺v扎多長(zhǎng)時(shí)間,很難留名后世。反正,凱恩確實(shí)成了那代人中最出色的作手,有過(guò)很長(zhǎng)一段色彩斑斕的歲月。

凱恩運(yùn)用著他掌握的炒股知識(shí)、經(jīng)驗(yàn)和才干,在哈維梅爾兄弟手下做事。哈維梅爾兄弟想讓他為美國(guó)糖業(yè)公司的股票打造一片市場(chǎng)。當(dāng)時(shí)他不名一文,不然肯定會(huì)繼續(xù)自力更生地操作,他是個(gè)非常了不起的大賭徒。在美國(guó)糖業(yè)公司的股票上,他做得非常成功,他讓這只股票成了最受歡迎、最活躍的一只。事情過(guò)后,他總被各個(gè)公司內(nèi)部請(qǐng)去操盤(pán)。有人對(duì)我說(shuō),他在這些公司內(nèi)部炒作時(shí),不會(huì)索要或者接收費(fèi)用,而是總要與公司其他成員那樣,得到一份該有的分成。他全權(quán)負(fù)責(zé)股票在市場(chǎng)上的情勢(shì),雙方總會(huì)產(chǎn)生各種叛離和偷跑的傳言,他與惠特尼·萊恩集團(tuán)的爭(zhēng)斗,就因?yàn)槭艿搅诉@樣的傳言攻擊。作手想被同伴誤解其實(shí)很容易,那些同伴不會(huì)像他一樣,知道自己所需為何。我明白這點(diǎn)是源于自己的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

讓人惋惜的是,凱恩1901年春完成的最偉大的杰作,即炒作美國(guó)鋼鐵公司的股票,沒(méi)有確切的記錄留給后世。以我的了解,凱恩與摩根先生一直沒(méi)聊過(guò)這事。摩根公司通過(guò)塔波特泰勒公司交易,而這家公司則是凱恩的老巢。塔波特泰勒是凱恩的女婿。我敢肯定,凱恩對(duì)這家公司的付出,是包括了通過(guò)努力獲得樂(lè)趣的。那年春天,他炒熱了市場(chǎng),也通過(guò)交易賺了幾百萬(wàn)美元。誰(shuí)都知道這件事。他對(duì)我的一個(gè)朋友說(shuō)過(guò),只短短幾周的時(shí)間,他通過(guò)公開(kāi)市場(chǎng),為股票承銷(xiāo)公司至少賣(mài)出了75萬(wàn)股。如果你了解了下面這兩件事情,就會(huì)明白這是很厲害的成績(jī)。首先,這是一只沒(méi)有在市場(chǎng)中歷練過(guò)的新股票,公司的總資本大過(guò)了美國(guó)當(dāng)時(shí)的國(guó)債總額。其次,也是那個(gè)時(shí)候,凱恩幫忙打造的另一個(gè)市場(chǎng)中,雷德、利茲、穆?tīng)栃值?、亨利·菲利普、弗里克及其他鋼鐵業(yè)的大腕們,也向大眾賣(mài)掉了幾十萬(wàn)股票。

當(dāng)然,市場(chǎng)走向有利于他,不光當(dāng)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況是這樣,人氣和沒(méi)有受限的資金支援也是他成功的因素。那時(shí)候的市場(chǎng)非常好,是一個(gè)很大的多頭,那樣的盛況再出現(xiàn)的概率很小。后來(lái)才發(fā)生了讓人受不了的股市大恐慌。1901年,凱恩炒作抬高的美國(guó)鋼鐵公司普通股是每股55美元,到了1903年股市恐慌的時(shí)候,暴跌到了10美元,1904年更是到了8又7/8美元。

我無(wú)法具體分析凱恩的所作所為,因?yàn)樗麤](méi)寫(xiě)過(guò)書(shū),一點(diǎn)兒詳細(xì)記錄都沒(méi)留下。比如,知道他在聯(lián)合銅礦公司是怎么樣炒作的,肯定會(huì)非常精彩。羅杰斯和洛克菲勒曾試圖把手中的股票拋出去,結(jié)果卻遭遇了失敗,只好求助凱恩幫忙。凱恩答應(yīng)了他們的請(qǐng)求。請(qǐng)記住,在羅杰斯的那個(gè)時(shí)代,他自己本身就是華爾街上一位特別厲害的企業(yè)家,洛克菲勒更是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)石油公司里最勇敢的投機(jī)人。其實(shí),他們手中擁有的資源非常強(qiáng)大,還有很好的個(gè)人名聲和很多年馳騁股市的老到經(jīng)驗(yàn),但卻需要?jiǎng)P恩幫忙。我說(shuō)這個(gè)故事是要告訴你,有的事還非得請(qǐng)專家做才行。這是一只由美國(guó)最厲害的幾個(gè)資本家支撐的備受青睞的股票,卻沒(méi)有很好的賣(mài)出市場(chǎng),如果想要賣(mài)出去,就得犧牲很多資金和名聲。羅杰斯與洛克菲勒聰明過(guò)人,所以覺(jué)得只有凱恩才能幫上他們的忙。

凱恩立馬投入到了工作當(dāng)中,他要應(yīng)對(duì)多頭市場(chǎng),按照票面價(jià)格賣(mài)出22萬(wàn)股聯(lián)合銅礦的股票。賣(mài)掉公司內(nèi)部的股票后,大眾還在繼續(xù)買(mǎi),價(jià)格也上升了10個(gè)點(diǎn)。公司看到股民們這么熱衷于這只股票的時(shí)候,居然變成了看好賣(mài)出的股票。有傳言說(shuō),羅杰斯還真的向凱恩提出建議,要做多。如果說(shuō)是羅杰斯想把股票倒給凱恩,那可信度就不高。羅杰斯那么聰明,肯定不會(huì)把凱恩當(dāng)冤大頭對(duì)待。凱恩按照以往做法,在漲勢(shì)好的時(shí)候,一直壓低賣(mài)出。當(dāng)然,他這么做是因?yàn)橛羞@樣的需求,有受到股市每天的小波動(dòng)影響。在股市里,跟在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上一樣,要牢牢記住大的謀劃和具體的做法之間是有區(qū)別的。

有個(gè)特別會(huì)空手套白狼的人,也是凱恩最信任的人,他前幾天對(duì)我說(shuō),在聯(lián)合銅礦的那次交易中,如果凱恩有一天發(fā)現(xiàn),自己手中沒(méi)有一點(diǎn)兒之前為了抬高股價(jià)而不得不買(mǎi)回來(lái)的股票,第二天他就會(huì)買(mǎi)進(jìn)幾千甚至幾萬(wàn)股,再過(guò)一天,他可能又會(huì)賣(mài)掉。接著,他不再去理會(huì)市場(chǎng),只讓市場(chǎng)自生自滅,同時(shí)也給市場(chǎng)一個(gè)適應(yīng)這種狀況的機(jī)會(huì)。他真想徹底賣(mài)出手中的股票時(shí),就會(huì)像我對(duì)你說(shuō)的那樣,一路壓低拋售。普通股民們都希望股市會(huì)反彈,而且空頭也會(huì)回補(bǔ)。關(guān)于這場(chǎng)炒作,一位和凱恩非常熟悉的人對(duì)我提到過(guò),說(shuō)凱恩幫助羅杰斯和洛克菲勒賣(mài)了股票,讓他們得到了大概2000萬(wàn)或者2500萬(wàn)現(xiàn)金,羅杰斯送給凱恩一張20萬(wàn)美元的支票。這讓人聯(lián)想到一個(gè)百萬(wàn)富翁的妻子,拿出5美分答謝紐約大都會(huì)歌劇院的女清潔工,因?yàn)榕鍧嵐退业搅艘淮畠r(jià)值10萬(wàn)美元的珍珠項(xiàng)鏈。凱恩退回了支票,并且順帶遞去一張紙條,說(shuō)自己又不是交易所的營(yíng)業(yè)員,非常高興能幫上這個(gè)小忙。羅杰斯接下了支票,寫(xiě)信說(shuō),非常期待能夠再次合作。沒(méi)多久,好心的羅杰斯向凱恩傳遞了內(nèi)幕消息,讓他在聯(lián)合銅礦股價(jià)到130美元的時(shí)候買(mǎi)進(jìn)。

真是個(gè)天才作手?。『脜柡Φ恼材匪埂P恩!他的秘書(shū)對(duì)我說(shuō),市場(chǎng)的走向跟他的預(yù)期一樣時(shí),他會(huì)很容易發(fā)脾氣。知道他的人說(shuō),他總是用冷嘲熱諷的口氣來(lái)說(shuō)話,讓人難忘,可以從中看出他的暴躁來(lái)。他脾氣好的時(shí)候是賠了錢(qián)后,那時(shí)他總表現(xiàn)得像很有教養(yǎng)的上流社會(huì)的人,非常和藹可親,說(shuō)話風(fēng)趣幽默,妙語(yǔ)連珠。

他身上具備了一個(gè)成功的炒股專家所必需的那種優(yōu)良品性,他不論在哪兒炒股都會(huì)很成功。很明顯,他從不做違逆股市大盤(pán)的事情,也從不莽撞行事,他一旦知道自己做錯(cuò)了,會(huì)立馬擺脫錯(cuò)誤軌道。

從他那時(shí)候到現(xiàn)在,證券交易的法律法規(guī)變化太多,比舊法規(guī)也嚴(yán)格了很多,在交易和利潤(rùn)上增加了不少賦稅,等等。所以,這個(gè)游戲貌似已經(jīng)發(fā)生了變化,凱恩的那些賺錢(qián)妙招現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)了。而且,有人對(duì)我們很肯定地說(shuō),華爾街現(xiàn)在的商業(yè)道德已經(jīng)提高了很多。不過(guò),我可以客觀地說(shuō),在美國(guó)金融發(fā)展史上,不管哪個(gè)時(shí)代,凱恩都會(huì)成為一個(gè)偉大的作手,因?yàn)樗莻€(gè)偉大的炒股手,對(duì)投機(jī)游戲了解得非常全面透徹。他之所以取得了這樣的成果,是因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)的情況容許他這樣做。如果他能在1922年的時(shí)候玩股票,一定會(huì)取得與1901年時(shí)同樣的成就,也會(huì)跟1876年他初從加州到紐約那樣獲得成功,那時(shí)候他兩年就賺了900萬(wàn)美元。有一類(lèi)人的腳步就是比普通人要快得多,不管跟怎樣的普通大眾在一個(gè)時(shí)代,他們天生就是領(lǐng)袖級(jí)人物。

其實(shí)時(shí)代的變化并沒(méi)有你所想的那么厲害。能夠獲得的利潤(rùn)確實(shí)大不如前,現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不是開(kāi)疆?dāng)U土的時(shí)代了,也就沒(méi)有了那些金融前鋒獲得過(guò)的那種利潤(rùn)??稍谟行┓矫妫瑓s更適宜炒作了,此外的其他方面都比凱恩那時(shí)候難多了。

廣告是一門(mén)藝術(shù),這是毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)的。把股市大盤(pán)當(dāng)作媒介一樣用來(lái)炒作,這也是廣告藝術(shù)。股市行情所呈現(xiàn)的應(yīng)該是作手們希望大家想看到的情況。故事的真實(shí)度越高,說(shuō)服力也越強(qiáng),同時(shí)廣告效果也越好。如今的作手們不但需要讓某只股票看起來(lái)很有力,而且也要真的讓它變得有力。所以,炒作的前提必須是要有健全的交易規(guī)則。這是凱恩能成為股市圣手的原因,他自始至終都是最合格的交易者。

“炒作”一詞已經(jīng)成了貶義,它需要被一個(gè)其他名稱代替。我覺(jué)得,假若炒作是為了賣(mài)出大把股票的話,那么炒作的過(guò)程并沒(méi)多神妙,也沒(méi)什么問(wèn)題。當(dāng)然,前提是炒作過(guò)程中不能混入誤導(dǎo)別人的因素。作手們必須要在股民中間尋找買(mǎi)股票的人,這是鐵定的。這些買(mǎi)主期望著能賺到大量利潤(rùn),所以也情愿承擔(dān)比正常商業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我不同情那些明明知道這個(gè)道理卻說(shuō)自己不能賺到輕松錢(qián)是因?yàn)閯e人的原因的人。這樣的人在賺錢(qián)時(shí)好像很聰明,但只要賠了錢(qián)就會(huì)把別人當(dāng)壞人和作手。這個(gè)時(shí)候,炒作從他們的嘴里說(shuō)出來(lái),就添加了別人在偷偷作弊的暗示,而真實(shí)的情形其實(shí)不是這樣。

一般來(lái)說(shuō),炒作是為了拓展出市場(chǎng),也就是說(shuō)能在任何時(shí)候都按照某個(gè)價(jià)位賣(mài)掉手中一大把的股票。有些公司內(nèi)部如果發(fā)現(xiàn)手中的股票因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)逆轉(zhuǎn)而沒(méi)辦法賣(mài)掉,會(huì)因此受到很大的損失,他們就會(huì)做出雇專家?guī)兔Φ臎Q定,他們認(rèn)為專家的水平和經(jīng)驗(yàn)有助于他們按照一定的秩序從股市緩緩抽身,而不至于受到很大的損失。

你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn),我沒(méi)有說(shuō)到那些盡力按照最低價(jià)買(mǎi)大量股票為目的的炒作,比如以買(mǎi)股票為手段而實(shí)現(xiàn)控制股票的行為,因?yàn)檫@樣的事情如今已經(jīng)不常出現(xiàn)了。

古德想著要真正控制西聯(lián)電報(bào)公司,就決定大量買(mǎi)入這只股票,而此時(shí)已經(jīng)好久沒(méi)有在交易大廳露過(guò)面的華盛頓·康納卻忽然出現(xiàn)在了交易所的西聯(lián)電報(bào)股票交易點(diǎn)。他開(kāi)始買(mǎi)進(jìn)股票了,大廳里的人們都嘲笑他怎么如此愚蠢地覺(jué)得他們很單純呢,所以都非常得意地把所有的西聯(lián)電報(bào)股票賣(mài)給他。他們覺(jué)得這是低級(jí)的手段,認(rèn)為康納在假裝古德想讓他買(mǎi)進(jìn),然后可以拉高股價(jià)了。這是炒作?我覺(jué)得我可以這樣回答:“是,但又不是?!?/p>

正如我所說(shuō),大多數(shù)情況下,炒作是為了按照最高的價(jià)格把手中所持股票賣(mài)給股民,這不光是個(gè)賣(mài)出的問(wèn)題,而且也是分散拋售。不管怎么看,一只股票在1000個(gè)人手中,比在一個(gè)人手中要好很多,這樣有利于市場(chǎng)。所以,作手們需要考慮的不僅是以高價(jià)賣(mài)出股票,也要考慮股票分散情況。

如果你后續(xù)不能誘使股民們從你手中買(mǎi)走股票,那拉抬股價(jià)到一個(gè)高價(jià)位,就沒(méi)任何道理。當(dāng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)不足的作手們準(zhǔn)備在頭部賣(mài)出股票遭遇失敗的時(shí)候,老手們就會(huì)好像很聰明地對(duì)你說(shuō):“你牽匹馬到水邊容易,但強(qiáng)迫它喝水就難了?!边@人真是好有創(chuàng)意啊。其實(shí),你必須記住炒作的一條規(guī)則,這是一條凱恩和其他厲害的老前輩們都很熟悉的規(guī)則,那就是要盡力把股票價(jià)格炒作到很高的價(jià)位,然后再一路壓低,分拋給普通的股民。

我還是從頭說(shuō)起吧。假設(shè)一個(gè)人、一個(gè)股票承銷(xiāo)商或者一家公司有一大把股票,想按照高價(jià)拋出,它在紐交所正常掛牌。股票買(mǎi)賣(mài)最理想的地方應(yīng)該就是公開(kāi)市場(chǎng),而最好的購(gòu)買(mǎi)者應(yīng)該是普通股民。和賣(mài)股票有關(guān)的談判應(yīng)該由一個(gè)人負(fù)責(zé),他是公司在位的或者已經(jīng)退位的董事,他準(zhǔn)備在交易所賣(mài)出這只股票,但是卻沒(méi)有成功。他已經(jīng)非常熟悉或者很快就熟悉股市流程了,他清楚必須要有一個(gè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)更豐富、更有水平的人來(lái)操作。他聽(tīng)到過(guò)或者本來(lái)就知道有很多符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的人,他打算運(yùn)用專業(yè)手段來(lái)操作。他尋找其中一個(gè)人,就像生病了去看醫(yī)生,或者需要工程技術(shù)時(shí)去找工程師一樣。

假設(shè)他聽(tīng)說(shuō)我非常擅長(zhǎng)股票交易,那我覺(jué)得他就會(huì)想方設(shè)法地查找與我有關(guān)的資料看,接著見(jiàn)我,如果時(shí)間合適,他還會(huì)到我辦公室登門(mén)拜訪。

我可能對(duì)這只股票恰好很了解,知道它的價(jià)值所在。對(duì)這些很了解本來(lái)就是我的分內(nèi)之事,也是我謀生的手段。來(lái)人會(huì)對(duì)我講他與他的朋友的需求,進(jìn)而提出與我合作的希望。

輪到我發(fā)言了,我讓對(duì)方把我覺(jué)得必要的能讓我知曉這次操作的資料交給我。我判斷一下這只股票價(jià)格,對(duì)它在市場(chǎng)交易中的可能性進(jìn)行評(píng)估,然后結(jié)合我對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)股市行情的判斷,預(yù)估這次操作會(huì)不會(huì)成功。

我如果通過(guò)所有的信息資料得出了令人滿意的結(jié)果,那我就會(huì)答應(yīng)合作,當(dāng)時(shí)就告訴他我的條件。假如他接受了我提出的條件,包括我需要的酬金,我就可以立即展開(kāi)操作了。

一般情況下,我需要得到并且也能得到一大筆股票認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán)。我絕對(duì)需要的是累進(jìn)認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán),這樣對(duì)誰(shuí)都很公平。認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán)股價(jià)一開(kāi)始比市場(chǎng)價(jià)低一點(diǎn)兒,然后慢慢升高。比如,我獲得了10萬(wàn)股的認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán),它的股價(jià)目前是40美元,我就一開(kāi)始用35美元認(rèn)購(gòu)幾千股,接著是37美元、40美元、45美元、50美元,逐步升高,直到75美元或者80美元。

如果經(jīng)過(guò)我的努力和炒作后,股價(jià)上漲了,而且到了最高的價(jià)位,人們都很熱心購(gòu)買(mǎi)它,我就可以賣(mài)掉一大部分了,我肯定要執(zhí)行我的認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán)。我獲得了利潤(rùn),我的客戶也一樣賺了錢(qián),這就是理當(dāng)出現(xiàn)的結(jié)果。我擁有的技術(shù)如果真是他們用錢(qián)所尋找的對(duì)象,那他們自然就能獲得價(jià)值。不過(guò),有時(shí)候?qū)Ψ阶罱K也有可能賠錢(qián),不過(guò)這樣的情況很少,因?yàn)槲以诮舆@份工作的時(shí)候就評(píng)估過(guò)自己能獲得的利潤(rùn)了,不然也不會(huì)接手。今年,我接手的那么一兩個(gè)任務(wù)運(yùn)氣不好,沒(méi)有賺到錢(qián)。原因也很多,不過(guò)這是另外一回事了,以后有機(jī)會(huì)我可能會(huì)講。

一只股票要想實(shí)現(xiàn)多頭走勢(shì),首先要做宣傳,讓人相信正有一個(gè)多頭走勢(shì)在伺機(jī)而動(dòng)。是不是聽(tīng)起來(lái)很有意思?你再看看,實(shí)際上也沒(méi)那么搞笑,不是嗎?其實(shí)最有效的宣傳,就是你真心實(shí)意地去讓這只股票活躍起來(lái),變得力道很大。說(shuō)完該說(shuō)的,做完該做的以后,全世界最好的公關(guān)人員就是股價(jià)機(jī)器,股市大盤(pán)走向就是最好的宣傳媒介。我沒(méi)必要去為客戶做任何宣傳,不必通過(guò)報(bào)紙報(bào)道股價(jià),不必讓財(cái)經(jīng)報(bào)道發(fā)表對(duì)公司未來(lái)有多看好,更不需要有粉絲跟在屁股后面。我只需要把這只股票玩得活躍起來(lái),就可以實(shí)現(xiàn)我特別想要的結(jié)果。股票交易很活躍的時(shí)候,就自然會(huì)有人想知道原因,當(dāng)然這一點(diǎn)也說(shuō)明,那些必要的原因會(huì)自己冒出來(lái),出現(xiàn)在媒體上,一點(diǎn)兒都不需要我去協(xié)助。

場(chǎng)內(nèi)股民們需要的只是交易活泛的股票。只要存在自由市場(chǎng),他們會(huì)在任何價(jià)位交易股票,看到活躍的交易就會(huì)買(mǎi)賣(mài)成千上萬(wàn)股,這些分散力量集合起來(lái)就很強(qiáng)大了。他們必定就是作手的首批買(mǎi)主。他們一直前行,跟著買(mǎi)賣(mài)。所以無(wú)論在整個(gè)操作的哪個(gè)時(shí)期,他們都是一股有用的力量。我知道凱恩常會(huì)利用最能做事的營(yíng)業(yè)員,既能瞞住他的炒作,同時(shí)也因?yàn)閯P恩知道營(yíng)業(yè)員們是拓展市場(chǎng)和傳播消息的好手。他經(jīng)常按照比行情高的股價(jià),通過(guò)口頭承諾,把認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán)交給營(yíng)業(yè)員,以便他們?cè)谀軌颢@利落袋之前幫點(diǎn)兒小忙。他能使他們獲得該獲得的利益。想讓這些行業(yè)內(nèi)的人為我做事,我自己一點(diǎn)兒額外的事情都不必做,只要把一只股票搞得活蹦亂跳就好。營(yíng)業(yè)員沒(méi)有多少要求。不過(guò),你也要明白,在交易所大廳里買(mǎi)進(jìn),是為了賣(mài)出賺錢(qián)。他們不會(huì)堅(jiān)持等到有很大的利潤(rùn),但一定要是那種很快就能兌現(xiàn)的利潤(rùn)。

我把一只股票搞活,以吸引股民們的眼球,其中的原因已然講明。我買(mǎi)賣(mài)一只股票,營(yíng)業(yè)員也會(huì)跟著交易。既然有這么多股票用于投機(jī),就像我堅(jiān)持的那樣,用認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán)把它鎖死,就不會(huì)有太大的賣(mài)出壓力。所以,買(mǎi)盤(pán)總要比賣(mài)盤(pán)強(qiáng),股民們主要不是跟著作手走,而是跟著營(yíng)業(yè)員走,他們會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)為買(mǎi)家。我對(duì)這樣的需求非常滿意,可能會(huì)拋出股票。如果市場(chǎng)需求是正常的,需要的股票數(shù)量就會(huì)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于我在炒作一開(kāi)始時(shí)被迫買(mǎi)進(jìn)的數(shù)量,如果這樣的話,我就會(huì)放空。這是技術(shù)層面的放空,也就是說(shuō),我賣(mài)出去的比我的持股還要多。這對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)是非常安全的,因?yàn)槲沂歉鶕?jù)認(rèn)購(gòu)權(quán)賣(mài)出的。當(dāng)然了,到了股民們沒(méi)有那么多需求了,股價(jià)就不再上漲,我就會(huì)停下來(lái)等待。

然后,如果這只股票不再上漲,大盤(pán)在某一天會(huì)因?yàn)槠\浂卣{(diào),或者那些眼光好的營(yíng)業(yè)員能看明白我的這只股票沒(méi)有人買(mǎi),他們就會(huì)放空這只股票,跟著他們的那些人也會(huì)放空。無(wú)論什么原因,我的股票價(jià)格開(kāi)始下跌。我就得買(mǎi)進(jìn),支撐這只股票,就像一只股票得到自己的公司派歡迎時(shí),應(yīng)該有的那種支撐一樣。而且,我還不用買(mǎi)進(jìn)股票,就能夠支撐住它,也就是說(shuō)我不用增加持股數(shù)量,省得以后還要往出賣(mài)。要記住,我如此支撐股價(jià)并不會(huì)因此損傷財(cái)力。自然,我的所作所為實(shí)際上是在回補(bǔ)我之前用高價(jià)放空的股票。那個(gè)時(shí)候,我能夠在股民們和交易人員的需求前提下,高價(jià)放空這些股票。你總該清楚地向人們表明,當(dāng)這只股票下跌了的時(shí)候,總會(huì)有人買(mǎi)。如此,一般會(huì)制止業(yè)內(nèi)人士莽撞地放空,也會(huì)讓那些擔(dān)驚受怕的股東暫緩拋出股票。當(dāng)股票的走勢(shì)越來(lái)越不好,你一般都會(huì)看到這樣的賣(mài)出壓力。一旦沒(méi)有支撐,股票馬上就出現(xiàn)這樣的情況。我這樣回補(bǔ),也是我所說(shuō)的穩(wěn)定程序中的一個(gè)步驟。

市場(chǎng)變好時(shí),我自然會(huì)一路前行賣(mài)出,可總也不會(huì)到阻止股票漲勢(shì)的程度。我這全是按照穩(wěn)定計(jì)劃進(jìn)行。誠(chéng)然,在合理有序的股市上漲情形中,賣(mài)出的越多,越能鼓勵(lì)那些保守的投機(jī)分子,他們可比魯莽的營(yíng)業(yè)員數(shù)量多得多,股價(jià)也遲早會(huì)變得疲軟,如此情況下,我賣(mài)出的越多,對(duì)這只股票的支撐就越大。因?yàn)槲乙恢痹诰S護(hù)放空的部位,所以對(duì)自己沒(méi)有危險(xiǎn),還能支撐股票。一般而言,當(dāng)我覺(jué)得價(jià)格到了能賺到利潤(rùn)的時(shí)候就賣(mài)出。不過(guò),我也常在無(wú)利可圖的時(shí)候賣(mài),因?yàn)橐獮樽约旱馁I(mǎi)進(jìn)創(chuàng)造或者增加買(mǎi)進(jìn)力量。這就是我說(shuō)的沒(méi)有任何風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的買(mǎi)進(jìn),我所做的不只是要拉抬股價(jià),或者為客戶賣(mài)出多少股票,也要為自己牟利。這是我不讓客戶為我提供操作資金的原因,我的收費(fèi)取決于我的操作能否成功。

當(dāng)然,我說(shuō)的這些并不是我一直在用的手法,我既沒(méi)有一種一成不變的僵硬系統(tǒng),也不會(huì)按照這種系統(tǒng)去操作。我會(huì)因勢(shì)而動(dòng),與時(shí)俱進(jìn),隨時(shí)調(diào)整。

如果想把一只股票賣(mài)出去,就該盡力炒作到最高價(jià)后再賣(mài)。我重復(fù)這一點(diǎn),一是因?yàn)檫@是最基本的原則,二是因?yàn)槲曳浅G宄藗兌枷嘈潘械馁u(mài)壓出現(xiàn)在頭部。有的時(shí)候,一只股票會(huì)停停走走,這樣的話,股價(jià)是不會(huì)上漲的,也就到了賣(mài)出的大好時(shí)機(jī)。你的賣(mài)出會(huì)讓股價(jià)下跌,甚至跌到你無(wú)法想象的地步,不過(guò)你一般也能拉起股價(jià)。只要我炒作股票的在我的買(mǎi)單下回升,那我就會(huì)很安全,如果有必要,我還可以有充足的信心去勇敢地花自己的錢(qián)去買(mǎi)進(jìn)股票,如同我買(mǎi)進(jìn)其他類(lèi)似情形的股票。這是最小阻力線,你記得我曾說(shuō)過(guò)與這個(gè)相關(guān)的交易見(jiàn)解嗎?最小阻力線被確定后,我會(huì)按該路線前進(jìn),并不是因?yàn)槲以谀莻€(gè)特殊的時(shí)刻炒作那只特定的股票,而是因?yàn)槲易允贾两K都是那只股票的操作人。

我的買(mǎi)進(jìn)如果不能拉動(dòng)股價(jià),我就會(huì)停止買(mǎi)進(jìn),然后再賣(mài)出,即便我恰巧沒(méi)在炒作它,我也會(huì)如此行事。你該清楚,賣(mài)掉一只股票的主要手段,是要一路向下賣(mài)。在股價(jià)下跌時(shí)能夠賣(mài)出那么多,簡(jiǎn)直讓人吃驚。

我再說(shuō)一遍,在炒作的時(shí)候,我從來(lái)沒(méi)有忘掉自己是股票交易人。畢竟我炒作股票的時(shí)候,所遇到的問(wèn)題與操作股票時(shí)是一樣的。作手如果不能讓股票按照自己的意愿波動(dòng),就要停止炒作。你在炒作的股票如果沒(méi)有按照應(yīng)該出現(xiàn)的情勢(shì)發(fā)展,就該馬上出脫,不要跟股市大盤(pán)講道理,也不要想著賺回你的利潤(rùn),趕快在還能夠脫身并且還算廉價(jià)脫身的時(shí)候就跳出來(lái),為時(shí)不晚。

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