I CRUISED off the coast of Florida.The fishing was good.I was out of stocks.My mind was easy.I was having a fine time.One day off Palm Beach some friends came alongside in a motor boat.One of them brought a newspaper with him.I hadn't looked at one in some days and had not felt any desire to see one.I was not interested in any news it might print.But I glanced over the one my friend brought to the yacht,and I saw that the market had had a big rally;ten points and more.
I told my friends that I would go ashore with them.Moderate rallies from time to time were reasonable.But the bear market was not over;and here was Wall Street or the fool public or desperate bull interests disregarding monetary conditions and marking up prices beyond reason or letting somebody else do it.It was too much for me.I simply had to take a look at the market.I didn't know what I might or might not do.But I knew that my pressing need was the sight of the quotation board.
My brokers,Harding Brothers,had a branch office in Palm Beach.When I walked in I found there a lot of chaps I knew.Most of them were talking bullish.They were of the type that trade on the tape and want quick action.Such traders don't care to look ahead very far because they don't need to with their style of play.I told you how I'd got to be known in the New York office as the Boy Plunger.Of course people always magnify a fellow's winnings and the size of the line he swings.The fellows in the office had heard that I had made a killing in New York on the bear side and they now expected that I again would plunge on the short side.They themselves thought the rally would go to a good deal further,but they rather considered it my duty to fight it.
I had come down to Florida on a fishing trip.I had been under a pretty severe strain and I needed my holiday.But the moment I saw how far the recovery in prices had gone I no longer felt the need of a vacation.I had not thought of just what I was going to do when I came ashore.But now I knew I must sell stocks.I was right,and I must prove it in my old and only way—by saying it with money.To sell the general list would be a proper,prudent,profitable and even patriotic action.
The first thing I saw on the quotation board was that Anaconda was on the point of crossing 300.It had been going up by leaps and bounds and there was apparently an aggressive bull party in it.It was an old trading theory of mine that when a stock crosses 100 or 200 or 300 for the first time the price does not stop at the even figure but goes a good deal higher,so that if you buy it as soon as it crosses the line it is almost certain to show you a profit.Timid people don't like to buy a stock at a new high record.But I had the history of such movements to guide me.
Anaconda was only quarter stock—that is,the par of the shares was only twenty-five dollars.It took four hundred shares of it to equal the usual one hundred shares of other stocks,the par value of which was one hundred dollars.I figured that when it crossed 300 it ought to keep on going and probably touch 340 in a jiffy.
I was bearish,remember,but I was also a tape-reading trader.I knew Anaconda,if it went the way I figured,would move very quickly.Whatever moves fast always appeals to me.I have learned patience and how to sit tight,but my personal preference is for fleet movements,and Anaconda certainly was no sluggard.My buying it because it crossed 300 was prompted by the desire,always strong in me,of confirming my observations.
Just then the tape was saying that the buying was stronger than the selling,and therefore the general rally might easily go a bit further.It would be prudent to wait before going short.Still I might as well pay myself wages for waiting.This would be accomplished by taking a quick thirty points out of Anaconda.Bearish on the entire market and bullish on that one stock!So I bought thirty-two thousand shares of Anaconda—that is,eight thousand full shares.It was a nice little flyer but I was sure of my premises and I figured that the profit would help to swell the margin available for bear operations later on.
On the next day the telegraph wires were down on account of a storm up North or something of the sort.I was in Harding's office waiting for news.The crowd was chewing the rag and wondering all sorts of things,as stock traders will when they can't trade.Then we got a quotation—the only one that day:Anaconda,292.
There was a chap with me,a broker I had met in New York.He knew I was long eight thousand full shares and I suspect that he had some of his own,for when we got that one quotation he certainly had a fit.He couldn't tell whether the stock at that very moment had gone off another ten points or not.The way Anaconda had gone up it wouldn't have been anything unusual for it to break twenty points.But I said to him,“Don't you worry,John.It will be all right tomorrow.”That was really the way I felt.But he looked at me and shook his head.He knew better.He was that kind.So I laughed,and I waited in the office in case some quotation trickled through.But no,sir.That one was all we got:Anaconda,292.It meant a paper loss to me of nearly one hundred thousand dollars.I had wanted quick action.Well,I was getting it.
The next day the wires were working and we got the quotations as usual.Anaconda opened at 298 and went up to 302?,but pretty soon it began to fade away.Also,the rest of the market was not acting just right for a further rally.I made up my mind that if Anaconda went back to 301 I must consider the whole thing a fake movement.On a legitimate advance the price should have gone to 310 without stopping.If instead it reacted it meant that precedents had failed me and I was wrong;and the only thing to do when a man is wrong is to be right by ceasing to be wrong.I had bought eight thousand full shares in expectation of a thirty or forty point rise.It would not be my first mistake;nor my last.
Sure enough,Anaconda fell back to 301.The moment it touched that figure I sneaked over to the telegraph operator—they had a direct wire to the New York office—and I said to him,“Sell all my Anaconda,eight thousand full shares.”I said it in a low voice.I didn't want anybody else to know what I was doing.
He looked up at me almost in horror.But I nodded and said,“All I've got!”
“Surely,Mr.Livingston,you don't meant at the market?”and he looked as if he was going to lose a couple of millions of his own through bum execution by a careless broker.But I just told him,“Sell it!Don't argue about it!”
The two Black boys,Jim and Ollie,were in the office,out of hearing of the operator and myself.They were big traders who had come originally from Chicago,where they had been famous plungers in wheat,and were now heavy traders on the New York Stock Exchange.They were very wealthy and were high rollers for fair.
As I left the telegraph operator to go back to my seat in front of the quotation board Oliver Black nodded to me and smiled.
“You'll be sorry,Larry,”he said.
I stopped and asked him,“What do you mean?”
“Tomorrow you'll be buying it back.”
“Buying what back?”I said.I hadn't told a soul except the telegraph operator.
“Anaconda,”he said.“You'll be paying 320 for it.That wasn't a good move of yours,Larry.”And he smiled again.
“What wasn't?”And I looked innocent.
“Selling your eight thousand Anaconda at the market;in fact,insisting on it,”said Ollie Black.
I knew that he was supposed to be very clever and always traded on inside news.But how he knew my business so accurately was beyond me.I was sure the office hadn't given me away.
“Ollie,how did you know that?”I asked him.
He laughed and told me:“I got it from Charlie Kratzer.”That was the telegraph operator.
“But he never budged from his place,”I said.
“I couldn't hear you and him whispering,”he chuckled.“But I heard every word of the message he sent to the New York office for you.I learned telegraphy years ago after I had a big row over a mistake in a message.Since then when I do what you did just now—give an order by word of mouth to an operator—I want to be sure the operator sends the message as I give it to him.I know what he sends in my name.But you will be sorry you sold that Anaconda.It's going to 500.”
“Not this trip,Ollie,”I said.
He stared at me and said,“You're pretty cocky about it.”
“Not I;the tape,”I said.There wasn't any ticker there so there wasn't any tape.But he knew what I meant.
“I've heard of those birds,”he said,“who look at the tape and instead of seeing prices they see a railroad time-table of the arrival and departure of stocks.But they were in padded cells where they couldn't hurt themselves.”
I didn't answer him anything because about that time the boy brought me a memorandum.They had sold five thousand shares at 299 ?.I knew our quotations were a little behind the market.The price on the board at Palm Beach when I gave the operator the order to sell was 301.I felt so certain that at that very moment the price at which the stock was actually selling on the Stock Exchange in New York was less,that if anybody had offered to take the stock off my hands at 296 I'd have been tickled to death to accept.What happened shows you that I am right in never trading at limits.Suppose I had limited my selling price to 300?I'd never have got it off.No,sir!When you want to get out,get out.
Now,my stock cost me about 300.They got off five hundred shares—full shares,of course—at 299?.The next thousand they sold at 299?.Then a hundred at ?;two hundred at ? and two hundred at ?.The last of my stock went at 298?.It took Harding's cleverest floor man fifteen minutes to get rid of that last one hundred shares.They didn't want to crack it wide open.
The moment I got the report of the sale of the last of my long stock I started to do what I had really come ashore to do—that is,to sell stocks.I simply had to.There was the market after its outrageous rally,begging to be sold.Why,people were beginning to talk bullish again.The course of the market,however,told me that the rally had run its course.It was safe to sell them.It did not require reflection.
The next day Anaconda opened below 296.Oliver Black,who was waiting for a further rally,had come down early to be Johnny-on-the-spot when the stock crossed 320.I don't know how much of it he was long of or whether he was long of it at all.But he didn't laugh when he saw the opening prices,nor later in the day when the stock broke still more and the report came back to us in Palm Beach that there was no market for it at all.
Of course that was all the confirmation any man needed.My growing paper profit kept reminding me that I was right,hour by hour.Naturally I sold some more stocks.Everything!It was a bear market.They were all going down.The next day was Friday,Washington's Birthday.I couldn't stay in Florida and fish because I had put out a very fair short line,for me.I was needed in New York.Who needed me?I did!Palm Beach was too far,too remote.Too much valuable time was lost telegraphing back and forth.
I left Palm Beach for New York.On Monday I had to lie in St.Augustine three hours,waiting for a train.There was a broker's office there,and naturally I had to see how the market was acting while I was waiting.Anaconda had broken several points since the last trading day.As a matter of fact,it didn't stop going down until the big break that fall.
I got to New York and traded on the bear side for about four months.The market had frequent rallies as before,and I kept covering and putting them out again.I didn't,strictly speaking,sit tight.Remember,I had lost every cent of the three hundred thousand dollars I made out of the San Francisco earthquake break.I had been right,and nevertheless had gone broke.I was now playing safe—because after being down a man enjoys being up,even if he doesn't quite make the top.The way to make money is to make it.The way to make big money is to be right at exactly the right time.In this business a man has to think of both theory and practice.A speculator must not be merely a student,he must be both a student and a speculator.
I did pretty well,even if I can now see where my campaign was tactically inadequate.When summer came the market got dull.It was a cinch that there would be nothing doing in a big way until well along in the fall.Everybody I knew had gone or was going to Europe.I though that would be a good move for me.So I cleaned up.When I sailed for Europe I was a trifle more than three-quarters of a million to the good.To me that looked like some balance.
I was in Aix-les-Bains enjoying myself.I had earned my vacation.It was good to be in a place like that with plenty of money and friends and acquaintances and everybody intent upon having a good time.Not much trouble about having that,in Aix.Wall Street was so far away that I never thought about it,and that is more than I could say of any resort in the United States.I didn't have to listen to talk about the stock market.I didn't need to trade.I had enough to last me quite a long time,and besides,when I got back I knew what to do to make much more than I could spend in Europe that summer.
One day I saw in the Paris Herald a dispatch from New York that Smelters had declared an extra dividend.They had run up the price of the stock and the entire market had come back quite strong.Of course that changed everything for me in Aix.The news simply meant that the bull cliques were still fighting desperately against conditions—against common sense and against common honesty,for they knew what was coming and were resorting to such schemes to put up the market in order to unload stocks before the storm struck them.It is possible they really did not believe the danger was as serious or as close at hand as I thought.The big men of the Street are as prone to be wishful thinkers as the politicians or the plain suckers.I myself can't work that way.In a speculator such an attitude is fatal.Perhaps a manufacturer of securities or a promoter of new enterprises can afford to indulge in hope-jags.
At all events,I knew that all bull manipulation was foredoomed to failure in that bear market.The instant I read the dispatch I knew there was only one thing to do to be comfortable,and that was to sell Smelters short.Why,the insiders as much as begged me on their knees to do it,when they increased the dividend rate on the verge of a money panic.It was as infuriating as the old“dares”of your boyhood.They dared me to sell that particular stock short.
I cabled some selling orders in Smelters and advised my friends in New York to go short of it.When I got my report from the brokers I saw the price they got was six points below the quotations I had seen in the Paris Herald.It shows you what the situation was.
My plans had been to return to Paris at the end of the month and about three weeks later sail for New York,but as soon as I received the cabled reports from my brokers I went back to Paris.The same day I arrived I called at the steamship offices and found there was a fast boat leaving for New York the next day.I took it.
There I was,back in New York,almost a month ahead of my original plans,because it was the most comfortable place to be short of the market in.I had well over half a million in cash available for margins.My return was not due to my being bearish but to my being logical.
I sold more stocks.As money got tighter call-money rates went higher and prices of stocks lower.I had foreseen it.At first,my foresight broke me.But now I was right and prospering.However,the real joy was in the consciousness that as a trader I was at last on the right track.I still had much to learn but I knew what to do.No more floundering,no more half-right methods.Tape reading was an important part of the game;so was beginning at the right time;so was sticking to your position.But my greatest discovery was that a man must study general conditions,to size them so as to be able to anticipate probabilities.In short,I had learned that I had to work for my money.I was no longer betting blindly or concerned with mastering the technic of the game,but with earning my successes by hard study and clear thinking.I also had found out that nobody was immune from the danger of making sucker plays.And for a sucker play a man gets sucker pay;for the paymaster is on the job and never loses the pay envelope that is coming to you.
Our office made a great deal of money.My own operations were so successful that they began to be talked about and,of course,were greatly exaggerated.I was credited with starting the breaks in various stocks.People I didn't know by name used to come and congratulate me.They all thought the most wonderful thing was the money I had made.They did not say a word about the time when I first talked bearish to them and they thought I was a crazy bear with a stock-market loser's vindictive grouch.That I had foreseen the money troubles was nothing.That my brokers' bookkeeper had used a third of a drop of ink on the credit side of the ledger under my name was a marvellous achievement to them.
Friends used to tell me that in various offices the Boy Plunger in Harding Brothers' office was quoted as making all sorts of threats against the bull cliques that had tried to mark up prices of various stocks long after it was plain that the market was bound to seek a much lower level.To this day they talk of my raids.
From the latter part of September on,the money market was megaphoning warnings to the entire world.But a belief in miracles kept people from selling what remained of their speculative holdings.Why,a broker told me a story the first week of October that made me feel almost ashamed of my moderation.
You remember that money loans used to be made on the floor of the Exchange around the Money Post.Those brokers who had received notice from their banks to pay call loans knew in a general way how much money they would have to borrow afresh.And of course the banks knew their position so far as loanable funds were concerned,and those which had money to loan would send it to the Exchange.This bank money was handled by a few brokers whose principal business was time loans.At about noon the renewal rate for the day was posted.Usually this represented a fair average of the loans made up to that time.Business was as a rule transacted openly by bids and offers,so that everyone knew what was going on.Between noon and about two o'clock there was ordinarily not much business done in money,but after delivery time—namely,2:15 P.M.—brokers would know exactly what their cash position for the day would be,and they were able either to go to the Money Post and lend the balances that they had over or to borrow what they required.This business also was done openly.
Well,sometime early in October the broker I was telling you about came to me and told me that brokers were getting so they didn't go to the Money Post when they had money to loan.The reason was that members of a couple of well-known commission houses were on watch there,ready to snap up any offerings of money.Of course no lender who offered money publicly could refuse to lend to these firms.They were solvent and the collateral was good enough.But the trouble was that once these firms borrowed money on call there was no prospect of the lender getting that money back.They simply said they couldn't pay it back and the lender would willy-nilly have to renew the loan.So any Stock Exchange house that had money to loan to its fellows used to send its men about the floor instead of to the Post,and they would whisper to good friends,“Want a hundred?”meaning,“Do you wish to borrow a hundred thousand dollars?”The money brokers who acted for the banks presently adopted the same plan,and it was a dismal sight to watch the Money Post.Think of it!
Why,he also told me that it was a matter of Stock Exchange etiquette in those October days for the borrower to make his own rate of interest.You see,it fluctuated between 100 and 150 per cent per annum.I suppose by letting the borrower fix the rate the lender in some strange way didn't feel so much like a usurer.But you bet he got as much as the rest.The lender naturally did not dream of not paying a high rate.He played fair and paid whatever the others did.What he needed was the money and was glad to get it.
Things got worse and worse.Finally there came the awful day of reckoning for the bulls and the optimists and the wishful thinkers and those vast hordes that,dreading the pain of a small loss at the beginning,were now about to suffer total amputation—without anaesthetics.A day I shall never forget,October 24,1907.
Reports from the money crowd early indicated that borrowers would have to pay whatever the lenders saw fit to ask.There wouldn't be enough to go around.That day the money crowd was much larger than usual.When delivery time came that afternoon there must have been a hundred brokers around the Money Post,each hoping to borrow the money that his firm urgently needed.Without money they must sell what stocks they were carrying on margin—sell at any price they could get in a market where buyers were as scarce as money—and just then there was not a dollar in sight.
My friend's partner was as bearish as I was.The firm therefore did not have to borrow,but my friend,the broker I told you about,fresh from seeing the haggard faces around the Money Post,came to me.He knew I was heavily short of the entire market.
He said,“My God,Larry!I don't know what's going to happen.I never saw anything like it.It can't go on.Something has got to give.It looks to me as if everybody is busted right now.You can't sell stocks,and there is absolutely no money in there.”
“How do you mean?”I asked.
But what he answered was,“Did you ever hear of the classroom experiment of the mouse in a glass-bell when they begin to pump the air out of the bell?You can see the poor mouse breathe faster and faster,its sides heaving like overworked bellows,trying to get enough oxygen out of the decreasing supply in the bell.You watch it suffocate till its eyes almost pop out of their sockets,gasping,dying.Well,that is what I think of when I see the crowd at the Money Post!No money anywhere,and you can't liquidate stocks because there is nobody to buy them.The whole Street is broke at this very moment,if you ask me!”
It made me think.I had seen a smash coming,but not,I admit,the worst panic in our history.It might not be profitable to anybody—if it went much further.
Finally it became plain that there was no use in waiting at the Post for money.There wasn't going to be any.Then hell broke loose.
The president of the Stock Exchange,Mr.R.H.Thomas,so I heard later in the day,knowing that every house in the Street was headed for disaster,went out in search of succour.He called on James Stillman,president of the National City Bank,the richest bank in the United States.Its boast was that it never loaned money at a higher rate than 6 per cent.
Stillman heard what the president of the New York Stock Exchange had to say.Then he said,“Mr.Thomas,we'll have to go and see Mr.Morgan about this.”
The two men,hoping to stave off the most disastrous panic in our financial history,went together to the office of J.P.Morgan & Co.and saw Mr.Morgan.Mr.Thomas laid the case before him.The moment he got through speaking Mr.Morgan said,“Go back to the Exchange and tell them that there will be money for them.”
“Where?”
“At the banks!”
So strong was the faith of all men in Mr.Morgan in those critical times that Thomas didn't wait for further details but rushed back to the floor of the Exchange to announce the reprieve to his death-sentenced fellow members.
Then,before half past two in the afternoon,J.P.Morgan sent John T.Atterbury,of Van Emburgh & Atterbury,who was known to have close relations with J.P.Morgan & Co.,into the money crowd.My friend said that the old broker walked quickly to the Money Post.He raised his hand like an exhorter at a revival meeting.The crowd,that at first had been calmed down somewhat by President Thomas' announcement,was beginning to fear that the relief plans had miscarried and the worst was still to come.But when they looked at Mr.Atterbury's face and saw him raise his hand they promptly petrified themselves.
In the dead silence that followed,Mr.Atterbury said,“I am authorized to lend ten million dollars.Take it easy !There will be enough for everybody!”
Then he began.Instead of giving to each borrower the name of the lender he simply jotted down the name of the borrower and the amount of the loan and told the borrower,“You will be told where your money is.”He meant the name of the bank from which the borrower would get the money later.
I heard a day or two later that Mr.Morgan simply sent word to the frightened bankers of New York that they must provide the money the Stock Exchange needed.
“But we haven't got any.We're loaned up to the hilt,”the banks protested.
“You've got your reserves,”snapped J.P.
“But we're already below the legal limit,”they howled.
“Use them!That's what reserves are for!”And the banks obeyed and invaded the reserves to the extent of about twenty million dollars.It saved the stock market.The bank panic didn't come until the following week.He was a man,J.P.Morgan was.They don't come much bigger.
That was the day I remember most vividly of all the days of my life as a stock operator.It was the day when my winnings exceeded one million dollars.It marked the successful ending of my first deliberately planned trading campaign.What I had foreseen had come to pass.But more than all these things was this:a wild dream of mine had been realised.I had been king for a day!
I'll explain,of course.After I had been in New York a couple of years I used to cudgel my brains trying to determine the exact reason why I couldn't beat in a Stock Exchange house in New York the game that I had beaten as a kid of fifteen in a bucket shop in Boston.I knew that some day I would find out what was wrong and I would stop being wrong.I would then have not alone the will to be right but the knowledge to insure my being right.And that would mean power.
Please do not misunderstand me.It was not a deliberate dream of grandeur or a futile desire born of overweening vanity.It was rather a sort of feeling that the same old stock market that so baffled me in Fullerton's office and in Harding's would one day eat out of my hand.I just felt that such a day would come.And it did—October 24,1907.
The reason why I say it is this:That morning a broker who had done a lot of business for my brokers and knew that I had been plunging on the bear side rode down in the company of one of the partners of the foremost banking house in the Street.My friend told the banker how heavily I had been trading,for I certainly pushed my luck to the limit.What is the use of being right unless you get all the good possible out of it?
Perhaps the broker exaggerated to make his story sound important.Perhaps I had more of a following than I knew.Perhaps the banker knew far better than I how critical the situation was.At all events,my friend said to me:“He listened with great interest to what I told him you said the market was going to do when the real selling began,after another push or two.When I got through he said he might have something for me to do later in the day.”
When the commission houses found out there was not a cent to be had at any price I knew the time had come.I sent brokers into the various crowds.Why,at one time there wasn't a single bid for Union Pacific.Not at any price!Think of it!And in other stocks the same thing.No money to hold stocks and nobody to buy them.
I had enormous paper profits and the certainty that all that I had to do to smash prices still more was to send in orders to sell ten thousand shares each of Union Pacific and of a half dozen other good dividend-paying stocks and what would follow would be simply hell.It seemed to me that the panic that would be precipitated would be of such an intensity and character that the board of governors would deem it advisable to close the Exchange,as was done in August,1914,when the World War broke out.
It would mean greatly increased profits on paper.It also mean an inability to convert those profits into actual cash.But there were other things to consider,and one was that a further break would retard the recovery that I was beginning to figure on,the compensating improvement after all that bloodletting.Such a panic would do much harm to the country generally.
I made up my mind that since it was unwise and unpleasant to continue actively bearish it was illogical for me to stay short.So I turned and began to buy.
It wasn't long after my brokers began to buy in for me—and,by the way,I got bottom prices—that the banker sent for my friend.
“I have sent for you,”he said,“because I want you to go instantly to your friend Livingston and say to him that we hope he will not sell any more stocks today.The market can't stand much more pressure.As it is,it will be an immensely difficult task to avert a devastating panic.Appeal to your friend's patriotism.This is a case where a man has to work for the benefit of all.Let me know at once what he says.”
My friend came right over and told me.He was very tactful.I suppose he thought that having planned to smash the market I would consider his request as equivalent to throwing away the chance to make about ten million dollars.He knew I was sore on some of the big guns for the way they had acted trying to land the public with a lot of stock when they knew as well as I did what was coming.
As a matter of fact,the big men were big sufferers and lots of the stocks I bought at the very bottom were in famous financial names.I didn't know it at the time,but it did not matter.I had practically covered all my shorts and it seemed to me there was a chance to buy stocks cheap and help the needed recovery in prices at the same time—if nobody hammered the market.
So I told my friend,“Go back and tell Mr.Blank that I agree with them and that I fully realised the gravity of the situation even before he sent for you.I not only will not sell any more stocks today,but I am going in and buy as much as I can carry.”And I kept my word.I bought one hundred thousand shares that day,for the long account.I did not sell another stock short for nine months.
That is why I said to friends that my dream had come true and that I had been king for a moment.The stock market at one time that day certainly was at the mercy of anybody who wanted to hammer it.I do not suffer from delusions of grandeur;in fact you know how I feel about being accused of raiding the market and about the way my operations are exaggerated by the gossip of the Street.
I came out of it in fine shape.The newspapers said that Larry Livingston,the Boy Plunger,had made several millions.Well,I was worth over one million after the close of business that day.But my biggest winnings were not in dollars but in the intangibles:I had learned what a man must do in order to make big money;I was permanently out of the gambler class;I had at last learned to trade intelligently in a big way.It was a day of days for me.
我在佛羅里達州的外海航行,這里是釣魚的好地方。我已經出脫股票,心情輕松自在,過得非常愜意。有一天,幾個朋友駕駛摩托艇,來到棕櫚灘海上玩。有人帶了一張報紙。那些日子我沒看過報紙,不管哪方面的內容,我都不想看。可是我瞄了一眼朋友帶來的報紙后,發(fā)現(xiàn)股市上漲了十來個點。
我對朋友說:“我要跟你們一起上岸?!迸紶杹韨€適度的反彈很正常,可此時還是熊市,華爾街上或愚蠢或絕望的股民們卻不管資金情況,把價格抬高到合理范圍之外,或是縱容某些人這樣做。對我來說,這樣太過分了。我必須得看看股市了,我不知道自己能干什么,或者不干什么,但我明白我最需要的是看看股市報價。
哈丁兄弟公司在棕櫚灘也有個分部,我走進去時看到了很多認識的人。他們很多人都在議論說很看好市場。他們都是一些僅僅憑著行情報價玩股票的人,總想著快速交易。這樣的股民沒多少長遠的眼光,他們的玩法也的確不需要這樣的眼光。我說過,我是怎么在紐約獲得“投機分子”這個稱號的。當然了,通常情況下,人們喜歡把他人獲利和炒股的事實夸大。這里的人聽說我在紐約的時候通過做空賺了很多錢,此刻他們還是想讓我再那樣篤信一把空頭。他們自己認為反彈還會持續(xù)一段時間,可同時又認為對抗反彈是我的責任。
我本來是來佛羅里達釣魚的,前一陣子我承受了很大壓力,我需要度個假??僧斘抑纼r格反彈不少的那時候,一下子感覺不需要度假了。我上岸時沒有想到要做什么,但是現(xiàn)在我知道我要趕緊放空股票。我是對的,必須要用我唯一的老方法,用錢來驗證我的判斷是否正確。把股票全部賣掉,這是一種慎重、有效而且可以說是愛國的行為。
我通過報價牌首先看到的是安納康達公司的股票馬上要突破300個點,簡直是飛躍上漲,而且里面肯定有個很猛的團隊在操控。有一條傳統(tǒng)的交易規(guī)則:當股票首次突破100、200或300點的時候,價格不會停滯不前,而是會繼續(xù)上漲很多,所以當它在突破重要關卡的時候,你馬上買,必定會賺一筆。膽子小的人不愛在股價創(chuàng)新高紀錄的時候買進,可是我卻有這種股價波動的“史實”來指導我。
安納康達是所謂的四分之一股票,也就是面值只有25美元的小額股,它的400股相當于100股的普通股票的面值,我估計到了300點后,它還會繼續(xù)上漲,很快就會到340美元。
不要忘了,我還是很看淡后市的,可是我也是個能靠行情走勢玩股票的人。我清楚安納康達若能按照我的估計發(fā)展,就會很快地波動。不管多快,都吸引著我。我已經培養(yǎng)了耐心,知道了怎么樣自我堅持,可我還是更喜歡快速行動。安納康達絕對不是牛皮股,我在它突破300點的時候買入,是因為我想證實自己的觀察,我這種意愿總是很強烈。
那時,買的人比賣的人多,所以股市上漲的情形會持續(xù)下去,因此觀察一段時間后再賣空比較適宜。對我來說,等一等也會有所收獲的,我可以從安納康這只股票中迅速賺取30點,我看空整個股市,卻看好這一只股票。所以我買了3.2萬股安納康達,相當于8000股整股。這只股票是一只很好的小型投機股,我相信自己的推斷,而且我還覺得,這一次賺的錢或許能夠增強我的保證金實力,為我以后放空打下基礎。
第二天,因為受到北邊暴風雨或者其他因素的影響,電報中斷了。我在哈丁公司坐等消息。大家都在閑聊,猜測著股市行情。股票投資人不能交易時總是這樣做。后來我們等到了那天唯一的一次報價,安納康達是292。
當時有個我在紐約認識的人跟我在一起,他清楚我做多了8000股。當聽到報價的時候,他也吃了一驚,所以我覺得他手里也有些安納康達的股票。他沒法判斷,那時股票是否會再跌十幾個點。按照安納康達之前上漲的走勢,現(xiàn)在跌個20點以上應該也有可能。可是我還是對他說:“約翰,不要擔心,明天就沒事了?!蔽掖_實是這么感覺的,可是他盯著我直搖頭,他就是這樣的人,自認為自己更懂一些。我哈哈大笑起來,然后繼續(xù)等著股市報價,可是再也沒有報價傳回來。我們得到的唯一報價是,安納康達是292美元。這表示我賠了10萬美元。我想要迅速行動,我罪有應得。
隔天后,電報線路恢復了,我們跟以往一樣看到了報價,安納康達的開盤價是298美元,后來漲到了302又3/4,不過沒多久又下跌了。而其他的股票也沒有進一步上漲的跡象,我下定決心,如果安納康達的股票如果回到301,我必須將整個事件看作是一種假象。按照正常情況,它應該能夠漲到310才對啊。假如股價反而下跌就表示前例欺騙了我,我出錯了。出錯的人唯一可做的就是及時改正錯誤。我買了足足8000股,希望能上漲個三四十點,這不是我第一次也不會是最后一次出錯。
安納康達又跌到了301。一跌到這個價位,我就悄悄跑到電報員身邊。他們可以直接跟紐約聯(lián)系,所以我對他說:“把我那整整8000股的安納康達股賣掉吧,全部賣掉?!蔽倚÷曊f話,生怕被別人知道我的行動。
他抬頭看著我,一臉驚恐的樣子,我點著頭說:“全部賣!”
“利文斯頓先生,你肯定不是說用市價交易吧?”他的樣子好像是因為營業(yè)員執(zhí)行錯誤,自己虧好幾百萬美元一樣。
不過我還是說:“賣!什么也別說了。”
此時,布萊克兄弟、吉姆、奧利弗都在交易大廳,他們沒聽到我和電報員說話。他們原來都是芝加哥有名的小麥期貨商人,如今又是紐約很有地位的股票商人,他們特別有錢,是股票大作手。
當我回到報價牌前的座位上時,奧利弗·布萊克一邊笑一邊沖我點頭。
“你會后悔。”他說。
“你什么意思?”我停下來問。
“明天你就得買回來。”
“買什么?”我問。除了那個電報員,我可沒對任何人說過。
“安納康達股票?!彼f,“你要用320美元買,你這做法可不明智啊?!彼χ?。
“什么做法不明智啊?”我似乎一臉茫然地問。
“你賣掉你的8000股安納康達,而且那么堅定?!辈既R克說。
我清楚誰都認為他特別精明,他經常根據內幕消息炒股,可我沒想到,他居然知道我的交易,我深信公司沒有出賣我。
“奧利弗,你怎么知道的?”我問。
他哈哈大笑著,對我說:“是查理·克里特斯說的?!彼傅恼悄莻€電報員。
“可他連動都沒動啊?!蔽艺f。
“我不知道你們在說什么?!彼⑿χf,“可是他發(fā)電報的時候,我可是聽清楚了所有的內容。幾年之前,別人給我發(fā)電報時搞錯了一句話,我就開始學習電報密碼了。我在像你剛才那樣告訴電報員指令的時候,我要確定,他是不是搞對了,他發(fā)的內容可得是我的想法啊。你賣掉了安納康達股票,一定會追悔莫及,它能漲到500美元?!?/p>
“這次可不會,奧利弗?!蔽艺f道。
他盯著我:“你這么自信???”
“不是我自信,股市行情就是這樣。”我說。實際上那兒并沒有接收股市行情的收報機,不過他知道我在說什么。
他說:“我聽說有一些家伙,就算看了行情記錄,也看不明白價格,反而像看列車時刻表一樣,只能看到股票到站和離站的時間。不過幸好他們都已經住在精神病院的小房子里了,四壁都是軟墊,他們不會傷著自己了?!?/p>
我不理會他,因為電報員這時給我送來了一個單子,他們已經按照299又3/4的價格賣掉了我的5000股。我清楚這里的報價很滯后,我告訴電報員的時候,棕櫚灘報價牌上還是301塊。我確信,紐交所正在賣的股票的實價比這還要低,所以要是那時有人花296買我的股票,我會高興壞的。這些過程都說明,我從不限價交易是多么正確。如果我把賣出的價格限定到300以上,肯定賣不出去。好吧,先生們,如果你們有了平倉的想法就一定要出手迅速,時不我待啊。
如今,我買股票的價格差不多是300,他們用299又3/4賣了整整500股整股,用299又5/8的價格賣了1000股,然后以299又1/2賣掉100股,以299又3/8和299又1/4的價格分別賣掉200股,剩下的按照298又3/4賣了。在拋售最后100股時,哈丁兄弟公司里最厲害的經紀人花了十五分鐘才賣掉,他們不想把股價砸下去。
我拿到最后這部分股票售出的單子后,就開始做真正促使我上岸的事情,也就是放空股票,我一定得這樣做,市場經過離奇的反彈后,哀求大家放空。人們又在說很看好股市。我卻覺得股市上漲已經到頭了,做空是安全的,沒什么可考慮的。
次日,安納康達股票的開盤價比296還低,奧利弗·布萊克本想著它會繼續(xù)上漲,很早就來瞧著。我不清楚他到底是不是做了多頭,到底做了多少,可是當他看到開盤價時,就再也沒法笑了。晚些時候,它還在下跌。我們后來聽說交易所里已經沒人買那只股票了。
當然,任何人都需要這樣的證明。我的賬面利潤不停地提醒著我,我沒做錯。我自然又多放空了一些。放空一切股票!熊市的時候,各種股票都在下跌。第二天是周五,華盛頓誕辰紀念日。我不能再在佛羅里達州釣魚了,我做了一大筆空頭。有人需要我堅守紐約,這人是誰?自然就是我本人。棕櫚灘又遠又偏,光發(fā)電報就能浪費大量珍貴時間。
我從棕櫚灘返回紐約,周一必須要在圣奧古斯丁等上三個小時的火車,那里有個經紀行,我自然要利用這點時間去看看股市走向。從上一個交易日到現(xiàn)在,安納康達股票又下跌了好多點。事實上它一直都在跌,直到那年秋天的暴跌為止。
到達紐約后,我做了差不多四個月的空頭。股市跟以往一樣來回反彈,我只能跟著平倉和放空。嚴格來講,我不是抓著頭寸紋絲不動。不要忘了,我在舊金山地震那次賺到的30萬全部折了進去,本以為不會出錯,可還是差點完蛋。我現(xiàn)在的做法非常小心,人在逆境中走過,就會很喜歡順境中的感覺,即使他還沒有攀到最高山峰。賺錢的方法就是去賺錢,而想賺大錢,就要選擇恰到好處的正確時機。身處這個行業(yè),就要將理論和實際結合起來,不能只是光會投機,而要既做好學生也要做好投機人。
我當時做得還是很好的,雖然現(xiàn)在我感覺那時的做法有很多不完美的地方。夏天到了的時候,股市蕭條了,看樣子只有在秋天才能變好。我認識的很多人都去了歐洲,有的準備要去。我覺得這是個好計劃,所以我也平了倉。我乘船前往歐洲時,一共賺了75萬,這對我而言是筆非常大的財富。
我在法國埃克斯萊班愉快地游玩,反正已經賺了足夠游玩的錢。能在一個好地方,有錢有朋友,一起鐵了心快活一場,簡直是一件特別爽的事,而??怂谷R班就具備這些條件。遠離華爾街,我差不多都要忘記它了,這一點我認為勝過美國任何一個度假勝地。我不需要再去與股市打交道,不需要交易,我賺的錢完全夠我用上很久。而且,我也知道回去后該怎么賺錢,肯定會賺得比在歐洲花費的要多很多。
有一天,我在《巴黎先鋒報》上看到了一條發(fā)自紐約的消息,煉鐵公司宣布要發(fā)放一筆額外股利,他們的股票也已經上漲了,整體股市行情也很不錯,而這也就影響了我在??怂谷R班的計劃。這個消息說明多頭集團仍在絕望地和大勢對抗,他們在跟常識和誠實頑抗,因為他們很清楚要發(fā)生什么事情,所以要借勢在股市風暴侵襲他們之前把股票倒出來??赡芩麄儾挥X得股市會有我估計的那么急迫和嚴重,華爾街的要人們總像政客一般靠臆想做事。但是我卻不能這么做,這對股民來說是很危險的事情?;蛟S也有那種不怕身陷泥潭的人。
以我的了解,一切在熊市中想通過操縱提升股價的炒股行為都會失敗??吹侥菞l消息后,我覺得只有一件事能做得稱心愉快,就是把煉鐵公司的股票放空。在股市資金出現(xiàn)問題的時候,那些人還在提高配股比率,這就像他們在跪下求我放空一樣。這種事情就像你小時候,有人找你挑戰(zhàn)一樣讓你生氣。他們挑戰(zhàn)我放空這只股票。
我賣掉了一些煉鐵公司的股票,還讓我在紐約的朋友們也做空頭。經紀人把單子給我的時候,我看到上面的股價比我在《巴黎先鋒報》上看到的還低6個點,這足以說明實情了。
我原計劃月底去巴黎,過三周后再回紐約,可當我拿到經紀人的單子后,當天就去了巴黎。到達巴黎的同一天,我向客船公司打電話咨詢,第二天就有去紐約的快船,于是我訂了船票。
就這樣,我比原計劃提前一個月回到了紐約,這里才是適合我放空股票的地方。我有大概50多萬的保證金,我回來不是因為不看好后市,而是因為我是個講理的人。
我又放空了很多股票。股市的資金越發(fā)緊俏了,短期貸款的利率也變高了,與之相應的是股價越來越低。我早就預感到是這樣。一開始,我的判斷害過我,可現(xiàn)在我成功了。不過,正兒八經的快樂是,我覺得身為一個炒股手,自己終于走對了路。我還有很多東西要學,但是我知道要怎么做。我不再犯錯,再不會采用爛辦法。在這個游戲中,分析行情是非常重要的。在適當的時候出手,堅持頭寸也特別重要。但是我最重要的發(fā)現(xiàn)是,必須要全面研究所有因素,考量自己的所作所為,以便預估接下來可能發(fā)生的狀況??傊?,我學會了為錢工作。我不會再去魯莽地下賭注,也不再關心如何掌握操作技巧,我通過鉆研和深思熟慮獲得了成功。我還發(fā)現(xiàn),誰也不能免于犯下愚蠢的操作失誤的危險。一個人操作愚蠢,就要為愚蠢付出代價。
我在股票公司賺了很多錢,我玩得很成功,成了人們平日的談資,不過是經過夸大的。他們把很多只股票的崩跌都歸功于我。不知道姓名的人也來向我表示祝賀。他們都認為最神奇的是我賺了那么多錢,卻只字不提我第一次跟他們談到熊市快來了時,他們都認為我是瘋狂的空頭,是在虧損之后惡意地發(fā)牢騷。在他們眼里,我預估到股市資金鏈斷裂不值一提。他們認為,對他們來說,我的經紀商的會計用了三分之一滴的墨水,才在賬簿的貸方寫完我名下的獲利,是驚人的成就。
過去,朋友們常常跟我講,在很多股票公司里,人們都在議論著哈丁兄弟公司的投機分子狙擊了想要抬高股價的多頭集團——他們在情勢很明顯,股市一定會在比較低的水準尋求支撐的情形之后很久,還設法抬高很多種股票的價格。一直到今天,他們還在談論我的幾次摜壓行動。
從9月下旬開始,資金市場就向全世界發(fā)出了警訊,可是大家都相信會有奇跡出現(xiàn),不愿賣掉手中的股票。當有個經紀人對我說起發(fā)生在10月第一周的一件事時,我?guī)缀鯇ψ约旱牟痪o不慢感到羞愧了。
你還記得吧,以前資金貸款是在交易大廳的貨幣池完成的。經紀人收到銀行的通知,說頭寸需要多少錢,就知道還需要借款多少。當然,銀行也知道這個??梢蕴峁┵J款的人會把錢拿到交易所,由幾個經紀人處理。他們主要營生的方式就是放貸。一般快中午的時候,當天的新利率就會公布,差不多就是當時貸款利率的平均值。生意還能通過公開投標達成,誰都可以知道進展。一般情況下,從中午到下午兩點的交易很少,不過過了交割時間兩點一刻后,經紀人就能知曉當天準確的現(xiàn)金頭寸,他們可以去貨幣池借貸需要的錢。這些通常都公開進行。
10月上旬的一天,我提到過的那位經紀人來找我,說他們都很生氣,有錢都不想去貨幣池,因為幾個大證券商總在那兒盯著,看到誰拿出錢就會圍過去。當然沒有一個公開做放款業(yè)務的人能夠拒絕這些機構。他們要是有償還能力和抵押品倒是好說了,問題是一旦他們打電話來借錢,這些錢就打了水漂。他們只要說一句沒錢還,不管借錢的人是否情愿,都得繼續(xù)借。所以,股票交易所想借錢給熟悉的人,一般會派人悄悄對他說:“需要100美元嗎?”代表的含意是:“想借10萬嗎?”銀行的資金經紀人也用這樣的辦法。你想想吧,貨幣池的情形真的是一片凄慘。
他告訴我說10月的那些日子股票交易所規(guī)定借錢的人可以自己確定利率,這已經成了證券交易所的習慣。你看,年利率一直在百分之百到百分之一百五十之間動蕩。我覺得讓借錢的人自己定利率,放貸人不會讓人覺得自己就是個高利貸主,可他一分錢都不會少拿。債主也自然不想要高利息。他只要錢,錢能到手就很好。
情況變得越來越不像話了,最終到了一發(fā)不可收拾的地步,無論樂觀與否,起初沒膽量承受小損失,現(xiàn)在終于沒辦法控制了。雖然他們也怕賠本,可是大多數人都沒有避開血本無歸的痛苦。我會永遠記住這個日子:1907年10月24日。
從一大幫要借錢的人那里傳出來的消息,很早就顯示借方愿意付出貸方認為應該要的利率。沒有足夠的錢來運轉,那天的人比平時多出了好多。交割時間剛到,已有一百多人在交易池等著,他們都想借款救急。如果沒錢,他們就得按照市場上的價格把股票賣掉,不計價格,因為買主像資金一樣稀少——那個時候連一美元都難以尋到。
朋友的合作者們和我一樣,不看好后市,公司也用不著去借錢??晌姨岬竭^的那位經紀人朋友,終于一臉憔悴地從交易池里擺脫了,他來到我這里。他清楚我有很多空頭頭寸。
他說:“老天爺啊,我不清楚到底怎么了,從來沒見過這樣的情況。不能這樣下去了,這還了得,我感覺現(xiàn)在就有人已經破產了。你賣不出股票,現(xiàn)在市場上一分錢都很難找到?!?/p>
“你說的什么意思???”我問。
他回答道:“你聽過這樣一個實驗嗎?把一只老鼠放到一個玻璃器皿中,再把空氣抽掉。你能看到老鼠的呼吸不斷減弱,小身體兩邊就像風箱一樣呼哧呼哧,真是可憐。它使勁兒地從玻璃器皿中獲得稀少的空氣。你能看到它喘不上氣來,眼睛都要從眼眶里跳出來了,慢慢地喘息著死掉。唉,我看到資金交易池的那些人時,覺得他們就是老鼠。哪里都沒有資金,也沒人買股票,他就沒法交易股票。如果你問我華爾街現(xiàn)在的狀況,我會說這個時候它已經病入膏肓了?!?/p>
這種情形讓我頓時沉思起來,我預測到會崩盤,可我承認沒有預測到我們國家有史以來最嚴重的一次資本恐慌。這樣繼續(xù)下去的話,對誰都是莫大的損害。
事情已經明擺著了,再等下去也起不了什么作用,地獄正在召喚他們。
后來,我聽說股票交易所總經理托馬斯知道大家頭頂都懸著一把劍,都在到處尋求幫助,于是他去拜訪了全美國最有實力的銀行——國家城市銀行的行長詹姆斯·斯蒂爾曼,他曾經自豪地說過,他們的貸款利率從來沒高出過百分之六。
斯蒂爾曼聽托馬斯講明情況后說:“托馬斯先生,我們必須要去跟摩根先生說說這個問題。”
他們都希望能夠為有史以來最嚴重的這次金融事件努力做點事情,于是他們到了摩根的辦公室。托馬斯剛向摩根講述問題的嚴重性,摩根先生就說:“回去吧,對他們說,錢會有的?!?/p>
“在哪里?”
“在銀行里?!?/p>
這種危機四伏的時候,誰都對摩根先生充滿信任,所以托馬斯沒再繼續(xù)查問詳情,就直接折回了交易大廳,向已經被判了死刑的老伙計們宣布緩刑。
接著在下午兩點半之前,摩根派來了范恩·埃德波公司的埃德波來交易廳,誰都知道他和摩根關系密切。我朋友說,這個老經紀人快步來到交易池跟前,像復興大會上規(guī)勸迷途者恢復信仰一般,高舉著手。之前從托馬斯那里得到消息的人們本來已經平靜了,現(xiàn)在又開始擔心計劃泡湯,發(fā)生更糟糕的事情。他們盯著埃德波的臉,看到他舉起了手,就都僵在了那里。
在無聲的沉寂中,埃德波說:“我有給你們貸款1000萬的權力,大家輕松點,誰都會有錢的?!?/p>
接著,他就開始了操作。他沒有把放款人的名字告訴要貸款的人,而是簡單記下了貸款人的姓名和所需資金,然后對他們說:“等著人通知你們去哪里拿錢?!币馑际?,稍后貸款人就可以去放款的銀行拿錢。
據說過了一兩天,摩根先生對那些擔驚受怕的銀行家們說,一定要向股票交易所提供需要的資金。
“可是我們沒有錢啊,錢早就全部放出去了?!?/p>
摩根正色言道:“儲備金呢?”
“這已經比法定限額都低了?!彼麄儽莸卣f。
“用?。浣鸬挠锰幘驮谶@里?!?/p>
銀行答應了,拿出了2000萬左右的儲備金,挽救了即將崩潰的市場。摩根先生是個很了不起的勇士,銀行到現(xiàn)在也沒有什么長進。
這一天,是我炒股以來印象最深刻的一天,也是這一天,我賺了100萬美元。這說明,我第一次經過精心布局的交易最終成功了,我之前預料的結果也出現(xiàn)了。不過更重要的是,我實現(xiàn)了一個狂妄的夢想,做了一天國王。
需要說明的是,我在紐約待了幾年,常會深入思考,為什么不可以像15歲在波士頓對賭行時一樣,也在紐約股票市場上游刃有余地掌控一切呢。我清楚自己有搞明白的一天,然后就不會再犯錯。那時候,我不光想做正確的事情,而且還有能做正確事情的資本,這就意味著權力。
請不要誤會,這不是個毫無節(jié)制的大夢想,也不是因為虛榮心而妄想,只是我的感覺而已。我認為曾經在富勒頓公司和哈丁兄弟公司把我打垮過的股市,終有一天會匍匐在我的腳下,那一天一定會到來。這一天真的來了——1907年10月24日。
我之所以這么說,是因為那天早晨,一個與我有過長期合作,也清楚我一直做空頭的經紀人和華爾街一家最著名的銀行合伙人同車。他對這位銀行家說,我這些年的交易量一直非常巨大,因為我確實在盡我最大的力量去賭博。
或許那個經紀人言過其實,好讓他的故事聽起來特別重要,也或許我有很多自己都不知道的粉絲,再或者這位銀行家比我更清楚問題的嚴重性,總之我朋友對我說:“我對他說,你覺得再推動一兩下,真正的股票銷售期到來時,市場會怎么變化。他聽得特別認真,我說完后,他還說稍晚一點兒的時候要找我辦事?!?/p>
當證券商人們發(fā)現(xiàn),用任何貸價都沒法弄來一分錢時,我清楚時機到了。我把經紀人指派到了各處。老天,有段時間太平洋鐵路公司的股票沒有一張買單,不管什么價格!你想想吧,其他股票也都是這樣。沒有資金可以支撐股票,也沒人愿意買進。
我的賬面利潤很驚人,而且我很清楚,要想撼動股價,要做的就是賣出股票。我賣出太平洋和其他六家股息較好的公司各1萬的股票,隨之而來的一定是哀鴻遍野。我認為,馬上要出現(xiàn)的股市恐慌會很慘烈,甚至政府都會產生要關閉交易所的想法,就像1914年8月世界大戰(zhàn)時一樣。
這正好說明我的浮動利潤要大幅度上漲了。
不過,要想把利潤換成現(xiàn)金,也是沒什么可能。不過還是要考慮其他事,其中之一是股票一直下跌,會對剛恢復的市場產生影響,從全局來看,這樣的股市恐慌對整個國家都會產生損害。
我決定,既然再這么熱心地做空是不聰明的做法,而且也不好玩,那么我如果繼續(xù)做空就違反邏輯了,所以我轉向開始買入。
經紀人替我以很低的價格買入股票沒多久,銀行就把我朋友叫去了。
“我讓人喊你過來,”他說,“目的是想讓你趕緊去找你朋友利文斯頓,對他說,我們希望他今天不要再賣出任何股票,市場的壓力已經很大了。要扭轉這次股市恐慌的確不是一件容易的事情。把你朋友的愛國熱情激發(fā)出來吧,面對這樣的局面,人一定要照顧大局,他有什么說法一定要第一時間告訴我?!?/p>
我朋友立刻就來找我了,他很講究技巧。我想他可能覺得我既然計劃擊垮股市,應該會把他提出的要求看作是放棄賺1000萬的機會。他同時也明白,那些人跟我一樣都知道會出現(xiàn)什么情況,卻還使勁兒把股票賣給大家,這是讓人很不齒的事情。
其實,那些股票大戶才是受害最嚴重的人,我用很低的價格買到的股票都是很有名的公司,當時我卻不知道,可也沒什么,我已經差不多平了所有空頭。我覺得既有機會買了便宜股票,若沒有人去打壓股市的話,我還幫忙恢復了股價。
所以我對朋友說:“你去告訴銀行的人,我答應了。我在他找你之前就明白,這件事的意義非同尋常。我不光今天不賣了,而且還要想辦法買入些。”我信守了承諾,當天就買了10萬股,還是多頭。此后的九個月里,我都沒再拋出股票。
這就是為什么我對朋友說,我的夢想實現(xiàn)了,做了一天國王的原因。那天的某段時間,股市確實是處于任人蹂躪的狀態(tài)。我沒有幻想自己很偉大,其實你知道的,我很明白人們指責我襲擊股市時,以及華爾街傳播我如何神乎其技時,是種什么感覺。
我沒有受到一點兒損傷就脫身了,報紙上炒作說利文斯頓這個“投機分子”賺了幾百萬。呵呵,我在那天收市前賺了差不多100萬,可我最大的獲利不是這個,而是看不到的收獲:我是對的,我預估了未來,并且策劃周密。我學到要想賺大錢必須要做的事情,我徹底與賭博劃清了界限,終于學會了怎么利用智商做大手筆的生意。這是我一生中最重要的日子。