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雙語·股票大作手回憶錄 第六章

所屬教程:譯林版·股票大作手回憶錄

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2022年04月25日

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IN the spring of 1906 I was in Atlantic City for a short vacation.I was out of stocks and was thinking only of having a change of air and a nice rest.By the way,I had gone back to my first brokers,Harding Brothers,and my account had got to be pretty active.I could swing three or four thousand shares.That wasn't much more than I had done in the old Cosmopolitan shop when I was barely twenty years of age.But there was some difference between my one-point margin in the bucket shop and the margin required by brokers who actually bought or sold stocks for my account on the New York Stock Exchange.

You may remember the story I told you about that time when I was short thirty-five hundred Sugar in the Cosmopolitan and I had a hunch something was wrong and I'd better close the trade?Well,I have often had that curious feeling.As a rule,I yield to it.But at times I have pooh-poohed the idea and have told myself that it was simply asinine to follow any of these sudden blind impulses to reverse my position.I have ascribed my hunch to a state of nerves resulting from too many cigars or insufficient sleep or a torpid liver or something of that kind.When I have argued myself into disregarding my impulse and have stood pat I have always had cause to regret it.A dozen instances occur to me when I did not sell as per hunch,and the next day I'd go downtown and the market would be strong,or perhaps even advance,and I'd tell myself how silly it would have been to obey the blind impulse to sell.But on the following day there would be a pretty bad drop.Something had broken loose somewhere and I'd have made money by not being so wise and logical.The reason plainly was not physiological but psychological.

I want to tell you only about one of them because of what it did for me.It happened when I was having that little vacation in Atlantic City in the spring of 1906.I had a friend with me who also was a customer of Harding Brothers.I had no interest in the market one way or another and was enjoying my rest.I can always give up trading to play,unless of course it is an exceptionally active market in which my commitments are rather heavy.It was a bull market,as I remember it.The outlook was favorable for general business and the stock market had slowed down but the tone was firm and all indications pointed to higher prices.

One morning after we had breakfasted and had finished reading all the New York morning papers,and had got tired of watching the sea gulls picking up clams and flying up with them twenty feet in the air and dropping them on the hard wet sand to open them for their breakfast,my friend and I started up the Boardwalk.That was the most exciting thing we did in the daytime.

It was not noon yet,and we walked up slowly to kill time and breathe the salt air.Harding Brothers had a branch office on the Boardwalk and we used to drop in every morning and see how they'd opened.It was more force of habit than anything else,for I wasn't doing anything.

The market,we found,was strong and active.My friend,who was quite bullish,was carrying a moderate line purchased several points lower.He began to tell me what an obviously wise thing it was to hold stocks for much higher prices.I wasn't paying enough attention to him to take the trouble to agree with him.I was looking over the quotation board,noting the changes—they were mostly advances—until I came to Union Pacific.I got a feeling that I ought to sell it.I can't tell you more.I just felt like selling it.I asked myself why I should feel like that,and I couldn't find any reason whatever for going short of UP.

I stared at the last price on the board until I couldn't see any figures or any board or anything else,for that matter.All I knew was that I wanted to sell Union Pacific and I couldn't find out why I wanted to.

I must have looked queer,for my friend,who was standing alongside of me,suddenly nudged me and asked,“Hey,what's the matter?”

“I don't know,”I answered.

“Going to sleep?”he said.

“No,”I said.“I am not going to sleep.What I am going to do is to sell that stock.”I had always made money following my hunches.

I walked over to a table where there were some blank order pads.My friend followed me.I wrote out an order to sell a thousand Union Pacific at the market and handed it to the manager.He was smiling when I wrote it and when he took it.But when he read the order he stopped smiling and looked at me.

“Is this right?”he asked me.But I just looked at him and he rushed it over to the operator.

“What are you doing?”asked my friend.

“I'm selling it!”I told him.

“Selling what?”he yelled at me.If he was a bull how could I be a bear?Something was wrong.

“A thousand UP,”I said.

“Why?”he asked me in great excitement.

I shook my head,meaning I had no reason.But he must have thought I'd got a tip,because he took me by the arm and led me outside into the hall,where we could be out of sight and hearing of the other customers and rubbering chairwarmers.

“What did you bear?”he asked me.

He was quite excited.UP.was one of his pets and he was bullish on it because of its earnings and its prospects.But he was willing to take a bear tip on it at second hand.

“Nothing !”I said.

“You didn't?”He was skeptical and showed it plainly.

“I didn't hear a thing.”

“Then why in blazes are you selling?”

“I don't know,”I told him.I spoke gospel truth.

“Oh,come across,Larry,”he said.

He knew it was my habit to know why I traded.I had sold a thousand shares of Union Pacific.I must have a very good reason to sell that much stock in the face of the strong market.

“I don't know,”I repeated.“I just feel that something is going to happen.”

“What's going to happen?”

“I don't know.I can't give you any reason.All I know is that I want to sell that stock.And I'm going to let 'em have another thousand.”

I walked back into the office and gave an order to sell a second thousand.If I was right in selling the first thousand I ought to have out a little more.

“What could possibly happen?”persisted my friend,who couldn't make up his mind to follow my lead.If I'd told him that I had heard UP.was going down he'd have sold it without asking me from whom I'd heard it or why.“What could possibly happen?”he asked again.

“A million things could happen.But I can't promise you that any of them will.I can't give you any reasons and I can't tell fortunes,”I told him.

“Then you're crazy,”he said.“Stark crazy,selling that stock without rime or reason.You don't know why you want to sell it?”

“I don't know why I want to sell it.I only know I do want to,”I said.“I want to,like everything.”The urge was so strong that I sold another thousand.

That was too much for my friend.He grabbed me by the arm and said,“Here!Let's get out of this place before you sell the entire capital stock.”

I had sold as much as I needed to satisfy my feeling,so I followed him without waiting for a report on the last two thousand shares.It was a pretty good jag of stock for me to sell even with the best of reasons.It seemed more than enough to be short of without any reason whatever,particularly when the entire market was so strong and there was nothing in sight to make anybody think of the bear side.But I remembered that on previous occasions when I had the same urge to sell and didn't do it I always had reasons to regret it.

I have told some of these stories to friends,and some of them tell me it isn't a hunch but the subconscious mind,which is the creative mind,at work.That is the mind which makes artists do things without their knowing how they came to do them.Perhaps with me it was the cumulative effect of a lot of little things individually insignificant but collectively powerful.Possibly my friend's unintelligent bullishness aroused a spirit of contradiction and I picked on UP.because it had been touted so much.I can't tell you what the cause or motive for hunches may be.All I know is that I went out of the Atlantic City branch office of Harding Brothers short three thousand Union Pacific in a rising market,and I wasn't worried a bit.

I wanted to know what price they'd got for my last two thousand shares.So after luncheon we walked up to the office.I had the pleasure of seeing that the general market was strong and Union Pacific higher.

“I see your finish,”said my friend.You could see he was glad he hadn't sold any.

The next day the general market went up some more and I heard nothing but cheerful remarks from my friend.But I felt sure I had done right to sell UP.,and I never get impatient when I feel I am right.What's the sense?That afternoon Union Pacific stopped climbing,and toward the end of the day it began to go off.Pretty soon it got down to a point below the level of the average of my three thousand shares.I felt more positive than ever that I was on the right side,and since I felt that way I naturally had to sell some more.So,toward the close,I sold an additional two thousand shares.

There I was,short five thousand shares of UP.on a hunch.That was as much as I could sell in Harding's office with the margin I had up.It was too much stock for me to be short of,on a vacation;so I gave up the vacation and returned to New York that very night.There was no telling what might happen and I thought I'd better be Johnny-on-the-spot.There I could move quickly if I had to.

The next day we got the news of the San Francisco earthquake.It was an awful disaster.But the market opened down only a couple of points.The bull forces were at work,and the public never is independently responsive to news.You see that all the time.If there is a solid bull foundation,for instance,whether or not what the papers call bull manipulation is going on at the same time,certain news items fail to have the effect they would have if the Street was bearish.It is all in the state of sentiment at the time.In this case the Street did not appraise the extent of the catastrophe because it didn't wish to.Before the day was over prices came back.

I was short five thousand shares.The blow had fallen,but my stock hadn't.My hunch was of the first water,but my bank account wasn't growing;not even on paper.The friend who had been in Atlantic City with me when I put out my short line in UP.was glad and sad about it.

He told me:“That was some hunch,kid.But,say,when the talent and the money are all on the bull side what's the use of bucking against them?They are bound to win out.”

“Give them time,”I said.I meant prices.I wouldn't cover because I knew the damage was enormous and the Union Pacific would be one of the worst sufferers.But it was exasperating to see the blindness of the Street.

“Give 'em time and your skin will be where all the other bear hides are stretched out in the sun,drying,”he assured me.

“What would you do?”I asked him.“Buy UP.on the strength of the millions of dollars of damage suffered by the Southern Pacific and other lines?Where are the earnings for dividends going to come from after they pay for all they've lost?The best you can say is that the trouble may not be as bad as it is painted.But is that a reason for buying the stocks of the roads chiefly affected?Answer me that.”

But all my friend said was:“Yes,that listens fine.But I tell you,the market doesn't agree with you.The tape doesn't lie,does it?”

“It doesn't always tell the truth on the instant,”I said.

“Listen.A man was talking to Jim Fisk a little before Black Friday,giving ten good reasons why gold ought to go down for keeps.He got so encouraged by his own words that he ended by telling Fisk that he was going to sell a few million.And Jim Fisk just looked at him and said,“Go ahead!Do!Sell it short and invite me to your funeral.’”

“Yes,”I said;“and if that chap had sold it short,look at the killing he would have made!Sell some UP.yourself.”

“Not I!I'm the kind that thrives best on not rowing against wind and tide.”

On the following day,when fuller reports came in,the market began to slide off,but even then not as violently as it should.Knowing that nothing under the sun could stave off a substantial break I doubled up and sold five thousand shares.Oh,by that time it was plain to most people,and my brokers were willing enough.It wasn't reckless of them or of me,not the way I sized up the market.On the day following,the market began to go for fair.There was the dickens to pay.Of course I pushed my luck for all it was worth.I doubled up again and sold ten thousand shares more.It was the only play possible.

I wasn't thinking of anything except that I was right—100 per cent right—and that this was a heaven-sent opportunity.It was up to me to take advantage of it.I sold more.Did I think that with such a big line of shorts out,it wouldn't take much of a rally to wipe out my paper profits and possibly my principal?I don't know whether I thought of that or not,but if I did it didn't carry much weight with me.I wasn't plunging recklessly.I was really playing conservatively.There was nothing that anybody could do to undo the earthquake,was there?They couldn't restore the crumpled buildings overnight,free,gratis,for nothing,could they?All the money in the world couldn't help much in the next few hours,could it?

I was not betting blindly.I wasn't a crazy bear.I wasn't drunk with success or thinking that because Frisco was pretty well wiped off the map the entire country was headed for the scrap heap.No,indeed!I didn't look for a panic.Well,the next day I cleaned up.I made two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.It was my biggest winnings up to that time.It was all made in a few days.The Street paid no attention to the earthquake the first day or two.They'll tell you that it was because the first dispatches were not so alarmring,but I think it was because it took so long to change the point of view of the public toward the securities markets.Even the professional traders for the most part were slow and shortsighted.

I have no explanation to give you,either scientific or childish.I am telling you what I did,and why,and what came of it.I was much less concerned with the mystery of the hunch than with the fact that I got a quarter of a million out of it.It meant that I could now swing a much bigger line than ever,if or when the time came for it.

That summer I went to Saratoga Springs.It was supposed to be a vacation for me,but I kept an eye on the market.To begin with,I wasn't so tired that it bothered me to think about it.And then,everybody I knew up there had or had had an active interest in it.We naturally talked about it.I have noticed that there is quite a difference between talking and trading.Some of these chaps remind you of the bold clerk who talks to his cantankerous employer as to a yellow dog—when he tells you about it.

Harding Brothers had a branch office in Saratoga.Many of their customers were there.But the real reason,I suppose,was the advertising value.Having a branch office in a resort is simply high-class billboard advertising.I used to drop in and sit around with the rest of the crowd.The manager was a very nice chap from the New York office who was there to give the glad hand to friends and strangers and,if possible,to get business.It was a wonderful place for tips—all kinds of tips,horse-race,stock-market,and waiters'.The office knew I didn't take any,so the manager didn't come and whisper confidentially in my ear what he'd just got on the q.t.from the New York office.He simply passed over the telegrams,saying,“This is what they're sending out,”or something of the kind.

Of course I watched the market.With me,to look at the quotation board and to read the signs is one process.My good friend Union Pacific,I noticed,looked like going up.The price was high,but the stock acted as if it were being accumulated.I watched it a couple of days without trading in it,and the more I watched it the more convinced I became that it was being bought on balance by somebody who was no piker,somebody who not only had a big bank roll but knew what was what.Very clever accumulation,I thought.

As soon as I was sure of this I naturally began to buy it,at about 160.It kept on acting all hunky,and so I kept on buying it,five hundred shares at a clip.The more I bought the stronger it got,without any spurt,and I was feeling very comfortable.I couldn't see any reason why that stock shouldn't go up a great deal more;not with what I read on the tape.

All of a sudden the manager came to me and said they'd got a message from New York—they had a direct wire of course—asking if I was in the office,and when they answered yes,another came saying:“Keep him there.Tell him Mr.Harding wants to speak to him.”

I said I'd wait,and bought five hundred shares more of UP.I couldn't imagine what Harding could have to say to me.I didn't think it was anything about business.My margin was more than ample for what I was buying.Pretty soon the manager came and told me that Mr.Ed Harding wanted me on the long-distance telephone.

“Hello,Ed,”I said.

But he said,“What the devil's the matter with you?Are you crazy?”

“Are you?”I said.

“What are you doing?”he asked.

“What do you mean?”

“Buying all that stock.”‘

“Why,isn't my margin all right?”

“It isn't a case of margin,but of being a plain sucker.”

“I don't get you.”

“Why are you buying all that Union Pacific?”

“It's going up,”I said.

“Going up,hell!Don't you know that the insiders are feeding it out to you?You're just about the easiest mark up there.You'd have more fun losing it on the ponies.Don't let them kid you.”

“Nobody is kidding me,”I told him.“I haven't talked to a soul about it.”

But he came back at me:“You can't expect a miracle to save you every time you plunge in that stock.Get out while you've still got a & chance,”he said.“It's a crime to be long of that stock at this level—when these highbinders are shoveling it out by the ton.”

“The tape says they're buying it,”I insisted.

“Larry,I got heart disease when your orders began to come in.For the love of Mike,don't be a sucker.Get out!Right away.It's liable to bust wide open any minute.I've done my duty.Good-by!”And he hung up.

Ed Harding was a very clever chap,unusually well-informed and a real friend,disinterested and kind-hearted.And what was even more,I knew he was in position to hear things.All I had to go by,in my purchases of UP.,was my years of studying the behaviour of stocks and my perception of certain symptoms which experience had taught me usually accompanied a substantial rise.I don't know what happened to me,but I suppose I must have concluded that my tape reading told me the stock was being absorbed simply because very clever manipulation by the insiders made the tape tell a story that wasn't true.Possibly I was impressed by the pains Ed Harding took to stop me from making what he was so sure would be a colossal mistake on my part.Neither his brains nor his motives were to be questioned.Whatever it was that made me decide to follow his advice,I cannot tell you;but follow it,I did.

I sold out all my Union Pacific.Of course if it was unwise to be long of it it was equally unwise not to be short of it.So after I got rid of my long stock I sold four thousand shares short.I put out most of it around 162.

The next day the directors of the Union Pacific Company declared a 10 per cent dividend on the stock.At first nobody in Wall Street believed it.It was too much like the desperate manoeuvre of cornered gamblers.All the newspapers jumped on the directors.But while the Wall Street talent hesitated to act the market boiled over.Union Pacific led,and on huge transactions made a hew high-record price.Some of the room traders made fortunes in an hour and I remember later hearing about a rather dull-witted specialist who made a mistake that put three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in his pocket.He sold his seat the following week and became a gentleman farmer the following month.

Of course I realised,the moment I heard the news of the declaration of that unprecedented 10 per cent dividend,that I got what I deserved for disregarding the voice of experience and listening to the voice of a tipster.My own convictions I had set aside for the suspicions of a friend,simply because he was disinterested and as a rule knew what he was doing.

As soon as I saw Union Pacific making new high records I said to myself,“This is no stock for me to be short of.”

All I had in the world was up as margin in Harding's office.I was neither cheered nor made stubborn by the knowledge of that fact.What was plain was that I had read the tape accurately and that I had been a ninny to let Ed Harding shake my own resolution.There was no sense in recriminations,because I had no time to lose;and besides,what's done is done.So I gave an order to take in my shorts.The stock was around 165 when I sent in that order to buy in the four thousand UP.a(chǎn)t the market.I had a three-point loss on it at that figure.Well,my brokers paid 172 and 174 for some of it before they were through.I found when I got my reports that Ed Harding's kindly intentioned interference cost me forty thousand dollars.A low price for a man to pay for not having the courage of his own convictions!It was a cheap lesson.

I wasn't worried,because the tape said still higher prices.It was an unusual move and there were no precedents for the action of the directors,but I did this time what I thought I ought to do.As soon as I had given the first order to buy four thousand shares to cover my shorts I decided to profit by what the tape indicated and so I went along.I bought four thousand shares and held that stock until the next morning.Then I got out.I not only made up the forty thousand dollars I had lost but about fifteen thousand besides.If Ed Harding hadn't tried to save me money I'd have made a killing.But he did me a very great service,for it was the lesson of that episode that,I firmly believe,completed my education as a trader.

It was not that all I needed to learn was not to take tips but follow my own inclination.It was that I gained confidence in myself and I was able finally to shake off the old method of trading.That Saratoga experience was my last haphazard,hit-or-miss operation.From then on I began to think of basic conditions instead of individual stocks.I promoted myself to a higher grade in the hard school of speculation.It was a long and difficult step to take.

1906年春,我遠離股市,在亞特蘭大度了個短假,想換換環(huán)境好好休整一下。順便提一下,我回到了一開始的那個經(jīng)紀(jì)商哈丁兄弟公司。我玩得很活躍,能夠操作三四千股,這沒比我20歲的時候在柯斯莫斯普利坦公司里玩得大多少,但是在紐約交易所,經(jīng)紀(jì)商替我買賣股票,與在對賭行里賭1點的波動是完全不同的。

你或許記得我提到過一件事,就是在柯斯莫斯普利坦公司時,我放空3500股制糖公司的股票后,感覺不太對頭后想馬上結(jié)束交易的那一次。該怎么說呢,我經(jīng)常會在冥冥之中有這種奇怪的感覺,我經(jīng)常會遵照這種感覺行事??捎袝r我又告訴自己,光靠一時半會兒的沖動就改變自己的頭寸是一件蠢事。我把自己的這種感覺歸因于抽的雪茄太多,導(dǎo)致睡眠不足,肝臟不太好。每當(dāng)我克制了自己的這種沖動,堅持我一開始的看法時,又總能找到些后悔的地方。好多回我都自我克制著沒有賣出,隔天去看,市場會很強勁,甚至可能上漲,于是我跟自己說遵從感覺賣出多么愚蠢。但是再過一天,股價一定會有大跌。在起起落落的過程中,我明白了要賺錢不一定光靠理智和邏輯頭腦,還要靠心理感應(yīng)。

我說件事,這件事對我影響很大。它發(fā)生在1906年我在亞特蘭大休假時期。有個同樣是哈丁兄弟公司客戶的朋友與我同行,那時候假期令人愉悅,我一點兒都不想靠近股市。當(dāng)然,要是市場特別好,我的頭寸又特別大的時候,我是沒法停止炒股而去玩耍的。我記得當(dāng)時是牛市,雖然股市跌了一點兒,不過各種跡象都表明它會上漲,所以人們都信心飽滿。

有一天早晨吃過飯后,我讀了紐約的所有早報,也看煩了這樣的日常場景:海鷗叼著蚌飛到大約6米高的地方,然后把它們丟到硬邦邦的潮濕的沙灘上,美美地吃上一頓。于是我和朋友到木板大道上閑逛,這算是一天里最好玩的事了。

還沒到中午,我緩步走在街上,呼吸著咸咸的空氣,百無聊賴地消磨著時間。在這里,有個哈丁兄弟公司的分部,我們每天早上都要順道去看看開盤情況,這成了無聊之人的習(xí)慣。

這次我們發(fā)現(xiàn)股市行情很好,交易也很活躍,朋友非??春么藭r的市場,他手里有一些在股價很低時買進的股票。他對我說,持股等著價格上漲真是明智的做法。我對他的話并沒有太在意,也不屑于與他討論。我看了看報價板,發(fā)現(xiàn)大多數(shù)股票都已經(jīng)上漲,然后看到太平洋鐵路公司的股票,我覺得此時應(yīng)該把它賣掉,也不知道為什么這么想,反正就有這樣的感覺。我自問原因,可就是無法回答。

我緊盯著報價板,但是因為一直想著這件事,什么也看不進去,滿腦子想的都是要放空太平洋鐵路公司的股票,我無法解釋為什么會有這樣的想法。

我的神情在別人看來一定很奇怪,站在旁邊的朋友碰了我一下,問我:“喂,怎么了?”

“我也不知道?!蔽抑荒苓@么說。

“你困了?”

“沒有,”我說,“我沒困。”

我想放空太平洋股票,我總能夠靠著這樣的感覺獲利。

我直接走向有空白單子的桌位,朋友跟在我后面。我迅速填好要賣掉1000股太平洋鐵路股票的單子后,遞給經(jīng)理。一臉笑容的經(jīng)理看完單子后臉色馬上變了。他瞪著我問道:“不會吧?”我沒說話,只是望著他。之后,他馬上把單子遞給了操作員。

朋友問我:“你這是干什么?”

“我要賣掉這只股票?!蔽艺f。

“啊?”他大喊了一聲。他是多頭,而我卻要做空,這里面一定有什么問題。

“太平洋鐵路的1000股?!蔽艺f。

“為什么呀?”他顯得很激動。

我搖了搖頭,沒法告訴他原因,可他肯定覺得我捏著內(nèi)幕消息呢。他拉著我的胳膊把我拽到門外沒人的地方,這里也不會有人聽到我們說什么。

“你有什么內(nèi)幕消息嗎?”他問我。

他很激動,太平洋鐵路是他最愛的股票之一,因為這家公司的發(fā)展前景很好,他堅信握著不撒手可以賺錢,不過他也愿意聽到些負面消息。

“什么消息也沒啊。”我說。

“怎么可能?”很明顯,他懷疑我說謊。

“真的沒什么消息。”

“那你為什么要賣掉?”

“我也不清楚。”我的確沒說假話。

“呵呵,算了吧你。”他說。他了解我是個有的放矢的穩(wěn)當(dāng)人,可現(xiàn)在卻要賣掉1000股太平洋鐵路。在市場走勢這么好的情況下,我賣出這么多股,一定有充足的理由。

“我不知道啊?!蔽艺f,“我就是覺得會發(fā)生些什么?!?/p>

“發(fā)生什么?”

“不知道!我說不明白,我只是想拋掉,我還想再追賣1000股?!?/p>

我再次走回桌子旁邊,又賣掉了1000股。如果剛才賣那1000股是對的,我就該多賣掉些。

“到底會有什么事呀?”朋友不依不饒地問我,他也猶豫起來,在考慮是不是要學(xué)我這樣。如果我直接對他說獲得了這只股票要下跌的內(nèi)幕消息,他肯定就不會糾纏著問了,連誰說的和為什么這樣的白癡問題都不會問,而會直接學(xué)我賣掉。

“什么事都可能有,可我沒法保證一定有什么事,我沒辦法對你說清原因,我又不能預(yù)知未來。”我說。

“你要瘋了。”他說,“你這個瘋子,沒有原因就要賣掉股票,你真的不清楚原因嗎?”

“我真不知道,我就是想賣掉?!蔽艺f。想拋股票的感覺來勢洶洶,我就又賣了1000股。朋友這下快崩潰了,他抓著我的胳膊說:“聽著,我們快離開這里,以免你放空整個股市。”

我已經(jīng)賣掉了很多,心里舒服了,所以也就沒等后面那2000股的成交單,就直接跟著他離開了。對我來說,即使有最好的理由,放空那么多股已經(jīng)很多了。沒什么理由,尤其股市行情整體不錯,沒有人會覺得熊市要來,放空那么多似乎更是過分。不過,每次我要是想賣的時候卻沒有出手,就總會非常后悔。

我把這樣的事情講給朋友們聽,有的人就對我說,那不是莫名的感覺,而是一種潛意識的思維,就是所謂創(chuàng)造性的工作思維。源于這樣的思維,藝術(shù)家們會做出一些連自己都無法搞清楚的事來。而我,可能是受到很多小因素的聯(lián)合刺激,這些小因素單個來說毫無意義,集合起來卻很有力量?;蛟S朋友那種不靠譜的自信也激發(fā)了我否定的精神,所以要選擇拋掉太平洋鐵路的股票來釋放,因為這是一只眾所周知會上漲的股票。我沒辦法對你說清預(yù)感的源頭,只知道當(dāng)我從那里出來時就已經(jīng)賣掉了3000股,而且是在股市上漲的時候,可我根本不擔(dān)心。

我想知道后面2000股的成交價格,所以我們吃過午飯后又去了那里。我發(fā)現(xiàn)股市的綜合行情很好,太平洋的股價也上漲了。

“你算是賠本了?!迸笥颜f。你都能想象得到他沒賣這只股票的得意樣兒。

第二天,股票繼續(xù)上漲,除了朋友的得意忘形外,我什么信息也沒得到,可我一直覺得我沒有賣錯,我自認沒做錯的時候就耐心十足,這有什么道理嗎?下午,太平洋的股票就停止了上漲,在那天快收盤時,開始下跌,沒多久就跌破到我賣3000股時的價格平均線,我更加覺得自己沒做錯,我自然必須多放空一些。所以在那天收市之前,我又賣掉了2000股。

就等于說,靠著這種預(yù)感,我拋售了太平洋鐵路公司的5000股,花完了我在哈丁兄弟公司分部的保證金。度假的時候,我沒辦法全力應(yīng)對放空這么多股票的現(xiàn)狀,只好放棄了假期,當(dāng)天晚上就回了紐約。誰都不知道會出什么事,我想我還是回到現(xiàn)場,在更熟悉一點兒的紐約,我能更迅速地應(yīng)對。

第二天,我們得到了舊金山發(fā)生大地震的消息,不過股市開盤只跌了幾個點而已,多頭很強勢,人們不會獨立對消息做出反應(yīng),這很常見。一旦處于很堅實的牛市,無論是否有報紙所說的多頭炒作在進行,某些消息傳出時,總是不會像華爾街偏空時那樣發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的效果。一切都看當(dāng)時的人氣而定。在這個例子里,華爾街股市沒有對地震因素做出評估,因為大家不愿意這樣做。在那天結(jié)束之前,股價還上漲了些。

我賣掉了5000股,災(zāi)難發(fā)生了,我的股票卻沒有下跌。我自信感覺沒錯,只是我還沒掙到錢,連一點兒小利潤都沒有。與我同去亞特蘭大度假的朋友在我賣掉股票時又慶幸又惋惜。他對我說:“預(yù)感是存在的,哥們兒,不過當(dāng)錢和人都傾向于多頭時,對抗不管用,他們肯定贏?!?/p>

“再等等看。”我說的是股價,我不想逃避,我知道事情比較嚴峻,太平洋公司的損失是最嚴重的,可是華爾街卻表現(xiàn)得很盲目,真氣人。

“等等看?等著你這張皮和其他熊皮都被暴曬在太陽底下,曬成個干皮?!彼苯亓水?dāng)?shù)卣f。

“你會怎么辦?”我問,“憑著南太平洋公司和其他鐵路公司蒸發(fā)了幾百萬就買太平洋的股票?他們付清損失后下一年的分紅從哪里來?你最多覺得問題還不算嚴重,可就因為這個就買受到嚴重損失的鐵路股票嗎?你說啊?!?/p>

可朋友只是說:“對,好像有道理,可我告訴你,股市不會與你想的一樣,行情記錄不會騙人,是吧?”

我說:“行情記錄總是滯后,不夠及時啊?!?/p>

“聽我說。在黑色星期五之前,有人和吉姆·菲斯克聊天,舉出至少十個金價要下跌的理由。他受自己的話鼓舞,最后對菲斯克說要拋掉幾百萬的黃金,菲斯克看著他說:‘去吧,趕緊地,賣完了別忘記請我參加你的葬禮哦?!?/p>

“對啊?!蔽艺f,“那人如果真的賣掉了黃金,看能撈多少。你也最好賣掉些太平洋的股票?!?/p>

“那不可能!我是個順勢而為的人,我這樣的人能開心賺錢?!?/p>

第二天,出現(xiàn)了更加完善的報道,股市開始下滑了,但是即使到了那個時候,下跌也沒預(yù)想的那么嚴重。在我眼里,世界上不存在能阻止股市猛跌的東西,所以我又賣出了5000股。是啊,這時候很多人都知道怎么回事了,我的經(jīng)紀(jì)人也樂意效勞了。這不是誰的錯,我預(yù)估的股市行情沒錯。過了一天,股市迅速下跌,我借機又賣出去1萬股。這是唯一可以做的事。

我不想其他,只知道自己沒錯,絕對正確,這是個絕佳的好機會,只看我怎么來利用。我持續(xù)地拋售著。難道我沒有想過,萬一賣了這么多,要是股市反彈了,我的利潤就會打了水漂,甚至連本錢都喪失掉嗎?誰知道我想過沒有,就算想過也不會有什么壓力,我不是個魯莽的賭徒,而是很小心謹慎的,誰都不能把地震造成的損失補回來,不是嗎?誰也不能在一個晚上就免費把坍塌的高樓復(fù)原,不是嗎?

我沒有魯莽,沒有發(fā)瘋,也沒有被勝利沖昏頭腦,更不會覺得一大部分舊金山在地圖上消失了,一個城市成了廢墟,是的,一點兒都沒錯。我沒有把心思花在等著恐慌發(fā)生上,好吧,第二天我就平倉,賺了25萬美金,這是我炒股以來獲利最多的一次,而且就這么幾天時間。剛開始時,華爾街一點兒都不理會地震的影響,他們還說一開始的那些報道沒多嚴重??晌蚁胝f的是,要想轉(zhuǎn)變公眾對待股市的看法,得需要很長時間,就連職業(yè)股民在大部分時間里都是遲緩而短視的。

我沒什么需要解釋的,不管科學(xué)還是戲說。我只是對你講講我是怎么做的,為什么要這樣做,最后獲得了什么。我注重的不是那個神奇的預(yù)感,而是我獲利25萬的事情。這件事情說明,只要給我機會,我就可以做得更大。

那年夏天,我到了薩拉托加溫泉度假,可總想著要看看股市。起初沒多累,想想股市也不煩躁,而且我在這里認識的人都對炒股興趣很大,我們順理成章地就討論上了。我覺得說和做之間有很大區(qū)別,有的人會讓你想到那種像對待懦夫一樣跟脾氣暴躁的老板談話的大膽的職員——確實讓你有這種感覺,他們只懂得嘴上那一套。

哈丁兄弟公司在薩拉托加也有分部,而且客戶還不少,真正的原因是做了廣告。實際上在偏遠的地方開設(shè)分部這件事本身就是打廣告,我也總會順道去轉(zhuǎn)轉(zhuǎn),坐在人堆邊上瞅瞅。那里的經(jīng)理是從紐約總部過來的,很和善,對朋友和陌生人都會熱心幫忙,也會借機拉一些業(yè)務(wù)。這里是內(nèi)幕消息充斥的地方——賭馬的、股票的、跑堂的——哪方面的消息都有,分部的人很清楚我對這些沒興趣,經(jīng)理也不會向我悄悄透露他從紐約獲得什么秘密。他只是把電報拿給我看,并說:“這是他們剛剛發(fā)的。”只有這樣。

我自然要盯著股市,對我而言,看報價板和研究判斷各種跡象是一種程序。我看到我的老伙計太平洋鐵路的股票又上漲了,而且還比較高,有人在買進,我觀察了兩天還是沒有買。我能肯定有個大客戶在買進,他肯定是個有大量資金而且知道怎么操作的高手,我覺得他很聰明。

我確定了這點后,立刻以160美元左右的價格大力買進。這只股票繼續(xù)表現(xiàn)良好,所以我繼續(xù)買進,每次成交500股,我買得越多,股市越強勁,卻沒有急速沖刺,我很滿意,我知道這只股票沒有理由不猛漲。

經(jīng)理忽然走到我跟前,他說紐約發(fā)電報了,問我在不在這里。得到答復(fù)后,有人過來說,讓我等會兒,哈丁先生要跟我通話。

我說沒問題,就又趁機買了太平洋的500多股,我不知道哈丁先生要對我說什么,估計不是關(guān)于炒股的事情,因為我有足夠的保證金來玩。經(jīng)理很快就來對我說,艾德·哈丁先生打長途電話找我。

我說:“你好,艾德?!?/p>

可是卻聽到他說:“你到底在干嗎?你瘋了呀?”

“是你瘋了吧?”我說。

“你到底要干什么?”他又問。

“你這是什么意思?”

“你買那么多那只股票干什么?”

“怎么了?我的保證金不夠嗎?”

“與保證金無關(guān),是讓你別這么蠢。”

“我不知道你在說什么。”

“你買太平洋的股票干嗎?”

“因為它在上漲啊?!蔽艺f。

“上漲個鬼啊!你難道不知道內(nèi)部人士正在倒貨給你嗎?你大概是最好欺騙的人了,還不如去賭馬呢,賠得還有勁兒。你別讓他們給耍了?!?/p>

“沒人耍我?!蔽覍λf,“我沒告訴過任何人?!?/p>

他繼續(xù)說:“你不要以為每次掉進去都會發(fā)生奇跡,你有機會就快退出來。那些大戶們都使勁兒往外賣呢,你還這樣買,簡直是胡鬧。”

“從記錄上看,是有人在買進啊?!蔽乙桓畹卣f。

“你啊,你的單子過來的時候我都快犯心臟病了,別傻了,趕快退出來吧,說崩盤就崩盤了,我言盡于此,再見。”說完他掛了電話。

哈丁很聰明,消息也非常靈通,沒有什么壞心眼兒,是個能做朋友的人,而且他所在的位置可以幫助他獲取很多內(nèi)幕。我買進太平洋的股票,靠的是這么多年對股票走勢的研究,以及我所看到的一些蛛絲馬跡,以經(jīng)驗來看,有跡象表明股價會大幅上漲。我不知道自己看出了什么變化,但是我猜想。我一定斷定:我認定股票被人買進,完全是因為有內(nèi)線在搗鬼。可能哈丁的話對我起了很大作用,他要制止我不能犯這么一個賠上老本的錯,不管是他的能力還是動機,都是值得信任的。所以我聽了他的話,我也不知道為什么要這么聽他的話。

我拋空了太平洋的股票,不能做多頭的時候當(dāng)然要做空頭,不然就是個蠢貨。所以我賣掉了那些股票后又拋了4000股,差不多都是以162美元的價格。

隔天太平洋公司董事宣布要配股一成。一開始華爾街上沒人相信這個消息。報紙開始抨擊這家公司董事會,就在華爾街的高手們不知所措、猶豫不決時,市場沸騰了起來,一些在場的股民在一個小時內(nèi)就賺了不少。我甚至聽說有個笨蛋不小心買錯股票,結(jié)果卻賺了35萬,第二周就賣掉了他在交易所的席位,去做農(nóng)場主了。

我聽到配股一成的消息后,就發(fā)覺我是活該倒霉,不聽經(jīng)驗的指揮,卻偏信內(nèi)幕消息,結(jié)果受了這么大損失。我僅憑一個頭腦清醒的朋友沒有私心的勸告,就對他的警告深信不疑,從而失掉了自己的原則。

當(dāng)看到太平洋股票創(chuàng)造了紀(jì)錄后,我就對自己說:“真不該賣掉這只股票啊?!?/p>

我現(xiàn)在只剩下哈丁兄弟公司分部的保證金了,這讓我沒有高興或者不高興,顯然我對股市行情的判斷是對的,但卻愚蠢地聽從了哈丁先生的話。事后說別人是不對的,而且我也不能再浪費時間,既然木已成舟,我就只能下單補空頭。我按照每股大概165美元的價格買了太平洋的4000股,也就損失了3個點。在收盤之前,經(jīng)紀(jì)人以172美元和174美元的股價買了一部分。我拿到單子后算了一下,因為哈丁先生的好心干擾,我賠了4萬美元,這次教訓(xùn)還不算貴,對一個連堅持自己做法的勇氣都沒有的人來說,這是個小代價。

我不太懊惱,按照行情記錄來看,股價還會上漲,這是罕有的波動,董事會做出的決定也是亙古未有,不過這次我要遵照自己的想法來做,我平了4000股的空頭,準(zhǔn)備根據(jù)股市的行情記錄玩一把,賺點錢。所以我毫無顧慮地買了4000股,第二天早上時,我賣掉了它們,這不光讓我賺回了賠掉的4萬美元,還凈賺了1.5萬。如果不是哈丁那么替我著想,我一下子就能賺很大一筆,但他也算幫了我一把,這是個教訓(xùn),我相信這次事件把我鍛造成了一個真正的股市商人。

我并不是說我所要學(xué)習(xí)的只是不去受內(nèi)幕消息擺布,堅守自己的原則,而是我真正找到了自信,從根本上與以前炒股的老方法劃清了界限。薩拉托加的這次經(jīng)歷是我最后一次依靠冒險和運氣賺錢,自此以后,我就開始全盤考慮股市,而不只是單獨地拘泥于個別股票。通過努力學(xué)習(xí),我終于讓自己在這個行業(yè)里達到了更高的層次,這一步走得的確漫長而艱辛。

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