克魯格曼有句名言:生產(chǎn)率不是一切,但是長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看,它幾乎就是一切。最近三年,英國(guó)的這一指標(biāo)竟然每年下降1.2%,這是怎么回事,該怎么應(yīng)對(duì)?德日等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的表現(xiàn)又是如何?FT經(jīng)濟(jì)評(píng)論員布里坦(Samuel Brittan)做出了分析。
測(cè)試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識(shí):
dunce 傻瓜,劣學(xué)生
crawl 爬行
sermon 布道
jargon 行話,術(shù)語(yǔ)
incremental capital to output ratio 增量資本產(chǎn)出比率,即要得到一個(gè)單位的產(chǎn)出,需要投入多少資本
groan 呻吟
pull one's socks up 努力
閱讀即將開(kāi)始,建議您計(jì)算一下閱讀整篇文章所用時(shí)間,并對(duì)照我們?cè)谖恼伦詈蠼o出的參考值來(lái)估算您的閱讀速度。
By Samuel Brittan
There is nothing wrong with the US economy a measure of redistribution would not put right
* * *
Economists are often accused of an obsessive preoccupation with real gross national or gross domestic product, two closely related measures of national output. These measures have their uses. They show that, among advanced industrial countries, the US has made the most impressive (but still modest) recovery from the pre-crisis peak of 2007-08. The UK remains below that peak, sharing the dunce’s cap with the euro area.
Nevertheless, promoting GDP at all costs would be an insane objective for long-term economic policy. GDP would be maximised by opening a country’s frontiers and promoting mass immigration. Maybe some of the immigrants would be unemployed or, in other ways, be a charge on social security. But, so long as there is a net addition to the labour force, the country’s GDP would almost certainly rise, however overcrowded and unbearable the country might be to inhabit.
A less bad approximation might be GDP per worker. But even that borders on the absurd – for it might be maximised by compulsory increases in working hours at the expense of leisure.
A better measure might be GDP per hour worked, often known as productivity. This at least does not foreclose the choice between work and leisure, which as far as modern production methods allow should be left to individual choice. I have been aided in examining the record here by a thoroughgoing piece of research by independent economist Andrew Smithers.
In the past 20 years, output per hour has grown by an average of 1.5-2 per cent per year in the leading industrial countries. But in the three years to the beginning of 2013 there has been a major reversal. US productivity has on this measure slowed to a crawl of 0.3 per cent growth per year, and the UK has achieved a magnificent average of minus 1.2 per cent. Germany and Japan are not doing all that well, but are at least in positive territory.
Do these dismal figures just reflect the slow recovery from recession of the two English-speaking countries, which will be reversed if recovery continues and gathers pace; or has there been a fundamental change for the worse? Mr Smithers fears the latter. Like most modern economists, he concentrates on quantifiable relationships. The most easily quantifiable aspect is the relation between investment and productivity growth. But despite the sermons on his subject from leftwing political economists, from UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson onwards, there is little long-term relationship between investment and growth.
It is worth concentrating instead, if the reader will excuse one piece of jargon, on the incremental capital to output ratio, or ICOR. This measures how much investment is required to produce a unit increase in output. Thus the lower the ICOR, the greater the apparent efficiency of the economy. ICORs are best estimated over long periods to reduce business cycle influences. On this measure, the US and the UK seem, surprisingly, far more efficient than Japan and Germany over a 20-year period, whether one looks at total or just business investment. But in the three years to the beginning of 2013, there has been a dramatic reversal by this measure, too. US ICORs have been lower than those of Japan and Germany, whereas British ICORs have shot up right out of the page.
Looking at intermediate periods, Mr Smithers fears that the rise in the US ICOR is more than a passing phase and that the productivity of new US capital has halved. Taking into account both productivity trends and the likely growth of the US labour force, he believes that the current US recovery will soon run into an inflation barrier and that the optimism of mainstream opinion at the US Federal Reserve is misplaced.
Where I differ from Mr Smithers is in the policy conclusions. The US is by far the richest country in world history. The Financial Times books section is nevertheless groaning with treatises on how US business needs to pull its socks up. But suppose good advice is not followed? There is nothing wrong with the US economy that a measure of redistribution towards both the less well-paid and public services would not put right. Some suggest this reallocation has gone further than generally realised but still has a good way to go.
Output per hour in the British economy is, however, still far below that of the US, and the ordinary British citizen would benefit from an approximation of performance towards American levels. This may require fundamental changes along the lines put forward by management experts and efficiency gurus. But I would try a bit of Keynesianism as well. How far the form of forward guidance set out by Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of England, may indirectly help in this direction by underpinning the current recovery is a matter I hope to discuss next month.
請(qǐng)根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內(nèi)容,完成以下自測(cè)題目:
1. What is "productivity", accoeding to the article?
a. GDP growth rate.
b. GDP per capita.
c. GDP per worker.
d. GDP per hour worked.
2. What is correct about incremental capital to output ratio, known as ICOR?
a. The higher the ratio, the higher the economic efficiency.
b. US's ICOR is lower than Japan and Germany.
c. Britain's economic efficiency is relatively enhancing.
d. ICOR is not a good measure of long term performance.
3. Economist Smithers fears "fundamental change for the worse", what is it?
a. That the rising ICOR for US is permanent.
b. That the US capital investment is not enough.
c. That the population of US is ageing fast.
d. That the Fed might not have the ability to help the economy.
4. "Productivity is not everything" means?
a. It ignores the choice beteen work and leisure.
b. Economies should invest to boost productivity.
c. The efficiency of investment in UK is alarmingly low.
d. Demographic changes could threaten productivity.
[1] 答案d. GDP per hour worked.
解釋?zhuān)哼@是作者在文章前幾段解釋的。
[2] 答案b. US's ICOR is lower than Japan and Germany.
解釋?zhuān)阂?0年的維度來(lái)看,英美的經(jīng)濟(jì)效率要高于德日,因?yàn)樗鼈兊腎COR要更低。但是2010-12年這三年,英國(guó)的這一指標(biāo)已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)這三個(gè)國(guó)家了。ICOR很適合進(jìn)行長(zhǎng)期比較,因?yàn)樗梢圆皇芙?jīng)濟(jì)周期的影響。
[3] 答案a. That the rising ICOR for US is permanent.
解釋?zhuān)菏访苌箵?dān)心兩件事:一是美國(guó)資本投資產(chǎn)出大大降低了,二是美國(guó)這種降低不是暫時(shí)的。他擔(dān)心的不是投資減少,而是投資效益降低。再加上人口的問(wèn)題(當(dāng)然美國(guó)的老齡化速度并不很快),美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇可能要碰到屏障。
[4] 答案c. The efficiency of investment in UK is alarmingly low.
解釋?zhuān)荷a(chǎn)率很重要,但是如何提高它呢?如果投入大量的資本也無(wú)法提升它怎么辦?這就是本文試圖提請(qǐng)讀者思考的問(wèn)題。